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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics explore why two patients who take the 
same medicine may respond differently, refl ecting individual differ ences in genes that 
affect disease susceptibility, disease characteristics, or the patients’ ability to metabolize 
drugs.1 Personalized medicine seeks to harness this knowledge by using genetic and 
other in vitro diagnostic tests to determine, before a prescription is written, whether the 
pa tient belongs to a population subgroup that should take the drug, avoid the drug, or 
take it in an ad justed dosage. The term “targeting” also is used to refer to this concept 
of basing treatment choices on a patient’s particular molecular, genetic, disease, or 
metabolic characteristics.
Genetic variability of drug response was fi rst sus pected in the 1950s,2 but it is only 
in the past dec ade that pharmacogenomics gained enough ex planatory power to offer 
real prospects of improv ing medical care. There has been some frustration with the slow 
pace at which basic pharmacoge nomic discoveries are being translated into clini cally 
useful products and treatment methods.3 This frustration may simply be a response to 
optimistic hyperbole that surrounded completion of the Human Genome Project several 
years ago, when personalized medicine was sometimes pre sented as being closer to 
clinical introduction than it actually was. Legal scholars and ethicists em braced person-
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1 See, e.g., The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), Committee 
for Proprietary Medicinal Products, POSITION PAPER ON TERMINOLOGY IN PHARMACOGENOMICS (EMEA, Report 
No. EMEA/CPMP/3070/01, London, (2002)), at www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/press/pp307001en.pdf; L.J. 
Lesko, R.A. Salerno, B.B. Spear, et al., Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development 
and Regulatory Decision Making: Report of the First FDA-PWG-PhRMA-DruSafe Workshop, 43 J. CLIN. 
PHARMACOL. 342, 343 (2003); Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL ISSUES (Nuffi eld 
Council on Bioethics, London, (2003)), at http://www.nuffi eldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/pharmacogenet-
ics/publication_314.html; T.E. Klein, J.T. Chang, M.K. Cho, et al., Integrating Genotype and Phenotype 
Information: An Overview of the PharmGKB Project, 1 THE PHARMACOGENETICS J. 167 (2001); F.S. Collins, 
E.D. Green, A.E. Guttmacher, & M.S. Guyer, A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research, 422 NATURE 
835, 840-2 (2003). 
2 Russ B. Altman, INTRODUCTION TO PHARMACOGENOMICS, Sl. 23, 1950’s/60’s classic PGx examples, at 
http://www.pharmgkb.org/resources/education/tutorials.jsp. 
3 Lawrence J. Lesko & Janet Woodcock, Translation of Pharmacogenomics and Pharmacogenetics: 
A Regulatory Perspective, 3 NATURE REVIEWS 763, 767 (2004); B.J. Evans, D.A. Flockhart, & E.M. Meslin, 
Creating Incentives for Genomic Research to Improve Targeting of Therapies, 10 NATURE MEDICINE 1289 
(2004);  Stuart Hogarth, Kathy Liddell, Tom Ling, et al., REGULATING PHARMACOGENOMICS: AN OVERVIEW OF 
DEVELOPMENTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO REGULATORY INITIATIVES: A REPORT FOR HEALTH 
CANADA (Cambridge, (2006)), at 7.
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alized medicine and debated its broader societal implications, such as discrimination 
and distributional impacts on the poor, even as phar macologists still were debating its 
basic clinical feasibility. Five years ago, one could fairly state that the legal debate was 
running ahead of the science.
More recently, this situation has begun to change. Pharmacogenomics is delivering 
a small but steady stream of approved medical products, and a grow ing list of pharma-
ceutical and medical device manufacturers is investing in pharmacogenomic research. 
Academic scientists continue to play an important role in this fi eld, but they are no 
longer alone and, indeed, may no longer account for the majority of research activity and 
expenditures. There is a sense that the science of pharmacoge nomics, after frustrating 
delays, fi nally is poised to have real clinical signifi cance. The legal debate is shifting 
from speculative problems to real ones. As summarized in a recent Health Canada report 
on pharmacogenomics, “There is now a general consensus that progress will be much 
slower than was fi rst hoped and much activity is now focused on understanding why 
this is and what can be done about it.”4
This article explores a group of regulatory problems that, if not solved, may slow the 
pace at which personalized medicine moves into wide clinical use. In the past decade, 
various studies were carried out in the United States5 and around the world to develop 
appropriate policies for regulation of genetic testing.6 Recommendations from these 
studies tended to address genetic testing in a gen eral manner, and there is a need to refi ne 
the analysis and explore issues specifi c to particular types of genetic test. The genetic 
tests used in per sonalized medicine present distinct medical, eco nomic, ethical, legal, and 
regulatory issues. Moving these tests into the clinic and ensuring their safe, effective use 
may require innovative regulatory approaches, new types of oversight bodies, and new 
ways of involving the medical and scientifi c com munities in the regulatory process.
For ease of reference, we will refer to the class of genetic tests used in personalized 
medicine as “treatment-adaptive biomarker” tests (TAB tests). They detect biomark-
ers (genes, proteins, and chemicals present in the human body), in response to which 
the course of a patient’s treatment may need to be adapted by selecting or avoiding 
particular drugs or biologic therapies (collectively, “drugs”), by ad justing the dose, or 
by taking special steps to man age risks after a drug is administered. TAB tests include 
predictive genetic tests, such as drug-me tabolizing enzyme genotyping systems that 
detect markers for genes that encode specifi c enzymes that affect a patient’s response 
to particular drugs. TAB tests also include tests for specifi c molecular targets on which 
4 Hogarth et al., supra note 3, at 7. 
5 See, e.g., Joint National Institutes of Health (NIH)—Department of Energy (DOE) Ethical, Legal 
and Social Implications Working Group of the Human Genome Project, Task Force on Genetic Testing, 
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES (N.A. Holtzman & M.S. Watson, eds., 
(Sept., 1997)), at http://www.genome.gov/10002404, see ch. 2; NIH, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Testing, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT (July, 2000) 
at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/gtdocuments.html, see Executive Summary at x; Dep’t. of Health & 
Human Servs. (HHS), Establishment of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 
67 Fed. Reg. 65,126 (Oct. 23, 2002).
6 See, e.g., U.K. Human Genetics Commission, GENES DIRECT: ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF 
GENETIC TESTS SUPPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC (Human Genetics Commission, London, (Mar., 2003)), at 
http://www.hgc.gov.uk/client/Content.asp?ContentId=266; Stuart Hogarth, David Melzer & Ron Zimmern, 
THE REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL GENETIC TESTING SERVICES IN THE UK: A BRIEFING FOR THE HUMAN GENETICS 
COMMISSION (Cambridge, (2005)), at http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/document.asp?DocId=97&CAtegoryId=8; 
World Health Org. (WHO), Quality & Safety in Genetic Testing: An Emerging Concern, at http://www.who.
int/genomics/policy/en/; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Genetic Testing: 
Policy Issues for the New Millennium (2001), at http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,2340,en_2649_37407_
1895632_1_1_1_37407,00.html; OECD, Quality Assurance and Profi ciency Testing for Molecular Genetic 
Testing: Survey of 18 OECD Member Countries (2005), at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/12/34779945.pdf. 
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certain drugs operate, such as the estrogen receptor for tamoxifen or the HER-2 pro tein 
for trastuzumab. Not all TAB tests are genetic tests, strictly speaking, since some detect 
pheno typic expressions of genes that are present either in the patient, in the patient’s 
tumor, or in the dis ease-causing virus or bacterium.
Although TAB tests may differ in their scientifi c properties, they pose a common 
set of regulatory problems. These problems often can be traced to: a) novel patterns of 
discovery and development in the fi eld of pharmacogenomics; b) the still-unde fi ned role 
that targeted therapies will play in future clinical practice; and c) unique technical charac-
teristics of targeted therapeutic products them selves. The novelty of these problems, 
at times, has made them diffi cult to spot, creating a risk that well intentioned policy-
development efforts will solve perceived problems in lieu of the real ones. Consensus 
solutions cannot be achieved, without consensus on what the problems are.
There has been a persistent failure to grasp how profoundly pharmacogenomics 
strains the existing regulatory paradigm for development, validation, approval, clinical 
introduction, and use of new medical technologies. This paradigm dates to the mid-
twentieth century and was designed to pro mote the safety and effectiveness of medical 
tech nologies then under development.7 Targeted thera pies explode this paradigm in a 
variety of ways, discussed in this article, and they pose new regulatory challenges that 
will require many good minds and much good data to overcome. This arti cle aims to 
stimulate debate about what the prob lems are, and it identifi es near-term steps to lay 
groundwork for solutions.
II. MULTIPLE MODES OF DISCOVERY AND NON-TRADITIONAL PRODUCT DE-
VELOPMENT PATHWAYS FOR TARGETED THERAPIES 
A. The Need to Accommodate Multiple Discovery and Development 
Pathways
There are three distinct scenarios for discovery of a targeted therapy, depending on 
when the targeting strategy (i.e., the pharmacogenetic targeting prin ciple or the molecu-
lar target on which a drug acts) is discovered, relative to discovery and development 
of the drug:
• prospective co-development of a drug and TAB test, based on a targeting strategy 
dis covered early in drug develop ment;
• discovery of a targeting strategy late in clinical trials of the drug, necessitating a 
revised development path if the drug and test are going to be offered for use together; 
and
• post-market discovery of a targeting con cept for a previously approved drug.
Clear regulatory-approval pathways are needed for products that fl ow from all three 
of these discovery scenarios.
Many nations, including the United States, rely on drug regulations that were designed 
in the mid-twentieth century. Premarket review of drug safety in the United States dates 
back to passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938,8 which was 
amended in 1951 to distinguish between prescription and over-the-counter drugs,9 and 
7 B.J. Evans & D.A. Flockhart, The Unfi nished Business of U.S. Drug Safety Regulation, 61 THE FOOD 
& DRUG L. J. 45 (2006).
8 FDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended (codifi ed at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399).
9 Durham-Humphrey Act, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951).
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again in 1962 to require premarket review of effi cacy as well as safety.10 This basic frame-
work was designed to accommodate the discovery pathways that yielded yesterday’s 
medi cal products. It presumes an orderly sequence of events in product development, 
with discovery preceding preclinical research, clinical testing, and product approval (See 
Figure 1). Pharmacogenomic discoveries may occur “out of order,” and the re sulting 
clinical products may not fi t well into the existing approval pathways.
Scenario I (prospective co-development of a drug and a TAB test) meshes fairly 
well with the tradi tional product-approval pathway. Trastuzumab (HerceptinTM) is an 
example of a biologic therapy for which the targeting strategy was discovered early in 
the product development cycle.11 Its manufacturer entered an agreement with a mo lecular 
diagnostics manufacturer to develop a screening test to use in targeting the therapy. The 
two products were approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in separate, 
but coordinated, biologics licensing and device ap provals granted on the same day.12
Phase I   Phase II Phase III            Postmarket
Upstream     Preclinical        Basic     Safety &      Safe &  Adverse Event 
Basic          Research        Safety,   Effective- Effective;            Reports &
Science                               Toxicity     ness       Conditions           Postmarket
& Warnings             Studies
Clinical (Human) Testing Phases
Figure 1
Phases of Drug Development
Lab, animal,    Lab, animal      20-80         A few        Several          Widespread      
human studies   tests and       healthy     hundred    thousand clinical use
and tests on    and tests on   subjects    subjects subjects
specimens      specimens
I. Prospective                               II. Late-phase                  III. Postmarket
co-development                     discovery with revised          discovery and      
of early discovery                       development path                 development
In 2005, FDA circulated a draft concept paper13 to clarify issues related to prospective 
co-development of drugs and TAB tests (Scenario I). A number of industry comments 
objected that Scenario I may not be the most likely discovery scenario in actual practice, 
since the mechanisms that would let a drug be targeted often are not discovered until 
drugs are tested on a large number of people during late-phase clinical trials (Phase 
10 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
11 Genentech, HerceptinTM (Trastuzumab) Development Timeline, at http://www.gene.com/gene/prod-
ucts/information/oncology/herceptin/timeline.jsp.
12 Id.; see also, FDA, New Monoclonal Antibody Approved for Advanced Breast Cancer (News release 
P98-27, (Sept. 25, 1998)).
13 HHS, FDA, Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper (April, 2005), at http://www.fda.
gov/cder/genomics/pharmacoconceptfn.pdf.
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II/III trials).14 These comments suggest that industry sees Scenario II as a likely mode 
of discovery for new targeted therapies.
A third possible scenario is that a targeting strategy may be discovered after a drug 
has received FDA approval and is in wide clinical use.15 There al ready have been many 
discoveries of this type. The fi rst FDA-approved Cytochrome P450 (CYP-450) test 
became available in 2004 after numerous research studies explored the role of this 
enzyme in metabolizing a variety of FDA-approved drugs.16 Unexplained variations 
in patients’ responses to older drugs may later be traced to genetic factors that affect 
drug metabolism. This has occurred, for example, with the decades-old cancer drug 6-
mercatopurine; azathioprine and 6-thioguanine; irinotecan; and the widely prescribed 
blood-thinning drug warfarin.17 Molecular targeting strategies are also subject to late 
discovery. For example, the long-used, nonspecifi c cyclophosphamide, methotrexate, 
and fl uorcil (CMF) chemotherapy regimen recently was found to be highly effective for 
a targeted population of patients identifi ed through use of multigene reverse transcriptase 
PCR technology to estrogen receptor-positive, lymph node negative breast cancer.18
Policy development must begin with a clear under standing of how pharmacogenomic 
discovery and development actually work (i.e., how common each of the three discovery 
scenarios has been in actual practice to date, and how common each dis covery scenario 
is likely to be in the future). This information is needed to guide regulators in develop-
ing appropriate processes for approv ing targeted therapies and TAB tests. If Scenarios 
II and III are expected to account for the lion’s share of pharmacogenomic discoveries, 
then high prior ity should be placed on identifying and addressing regulatory issues 
that these discovery scenarios present. If Scenario I is expected to account for most 
targeted therapies in the future, then a focus on prospective drug/test co-development 
may be appropriate.
Historical discovery patterns could be clarifi ed using publicly available data, such as 
the Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base (PHARMGKB),19 funded 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). THE PHARMGKB database currently contains 
information on 385 drugs and various gene-drug, gene-disease, and gene-drug-disease 
associations and describes the type of evidence that is available to support these associa-
tions. For drugs with known genetic variations in patient response, the relevant discovery 
scenario can be deduced through a review of scientifi c literature and interviews with 
persons involved in discovering the biomarkers that are predictive of patient response 
to each such drug. A rough forecast of future discovery scenarios could be developed 
by surveying the types of research now underway. If numerous studies are underway 
to explore differential patient response to drugs that already are FDA-approved, this 
would tend to suggest that Scenario III discoveries may be common in coming years. 
It is critical to design regulatory approval pathways that correspond to the actual fl ow 
of discoveries in the fi eld of pharmacogenomics.
14 Letter from Robert Yocher, Genzyme Corp., to FDA (July 15, 2005), p. 1; Letter from Sue T. Hall, 
GlaxoSmithKline, to FDA (June 30, 2005), see attached Comments, § 6, p. 4; Letter from Carolyn D. Jones, 
Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), to FDA (July 15, 2005), p. 2.
15 G.W. Sledge, What is targeted therapy? 23 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1614, 1614-15 (2005).
16 FDA, New Device Clearance: Roche Amplichip Cytochrome P450 Genotyping tests and Affymetrix 
GeneChip Microarray Instrumentation System—K042259, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/mda/docs/k042259.
html; see also, Information on CYP2D6 allele nomenclature, at http://www.imm.ki.se/CYPalleles/cyp2d6.
htm, and Brief description of Cytochrome P4502D6, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/dispomim.
cgi?id=124030. 
17 Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 3, at 767.
18 Sledge, supra note 15, at 1614.
19 Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base, at http://www.pharmgkb.org/; see, 
generally, Klein et al., supra note 1, for a description of this database.
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B. Barriers to Clinical Translation of Scenario II Discoveries (Discovery 
of a Targeting Strategy during Late-phase Clinical Trials)
There appear to be serious problems translating Scenario II discoveries (discover-
ies made during late-phase clinical trials) into new targeted therapies. When genetic 
variability of drug response is discovered late in clinical trials, the business outcome 
often is drug development failure (i.e., attrition of the drug from any further develop-
ment). This contrasts with earlier hope that pharmacogenomics would let such drugs 
be “rescued,” i.e., let the drugs be recast as targeted therapies for genetically defi ned 
subpopulations, when late-phase trials fail to demonstrate safety and effectiveness for 
the trial population at large.20 To date, there have been few, if any, actual examples of 
drug rescue in which a Scenario II discovery made it to the market as a new targeted 
therapy.21 Just how common these problems are, and what is causing them, is not 
well understood.
To inform policy in this area, there is a need for postmortem studies of cases 
where targeting strategies have been discovered late in clinical drug trials (Scenario 
II discoveries), including cases that ended in drug development failure and cases (if 
any) where the drug was subsequently brought to market as a targeted therapy. What 
commercial alternatives did manufacturers and regulators consider in each case? Did 
they consider pressing forward with approval of the drug for untargeted use, perhaps 
with a warning that patient response may vary based on genetic factors? Did they 
consider developing the drug further for targeted use in a narrow subpopulation? What 
factors drove the fi nal decision? Can the barriers to clinical introduction be addressed 
through appropriate policies?
Multiple factors may be contributing to the slow clinical translation of Scenario II 
discoveries. These factors may include perceived ethical and liability issues of bringing 
a drug to market, when there is a suspected genetic variability in drug response that 
is not yet known to be valid. Informed consent law and medical practice regulations 
may need to be modernized to address new issues that pharmacogenomics presents 
(e.g., should patients’ informed consent be required for drugs that have a suspected, 
but uncertain, genetic variability in response? Who should be liable for drug injuries 
arising from physicians’ off-label use of a targeted drug in subpopulations for which 
it was not intended?) At present, there are no clear rules for assessing the legal im-
pact of a biomarker’s validation status. Just how strong does the association between 
genotype and drug response need to be, to take on various types of legal signifi cance 
(e.g., to justify holding a physician liable for prescribing the drug without ordering 
a TAB test, or to justify denying approval of a drug until there is a screening test 
available for clinical use)? This legal uncertainty may be chilling development of 
new targeted therapies. It calls for thorough review of state statutes, state case law, 
20 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffi n Epps, Ethical and Legal Implications of Pharma-
cogenomics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 228, 228 (2001); Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics 
Will Impact The Federal Regulation of Clinical Trials and the New Drug Approval Process, 58 THE FOOD & 
DRUG L. J. 103, 113 (2003).
21 BiDilTM, a combination of hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate was approved for treatment of heart 
failure in self-identifi ed African American patients in 2005; however, it is not an example of a targeted therapy 
in the true sense, since the genetic targeting mechanism was still unknown at the time of approval. See FDA, 
FDA Approves BiDil Heart Failure Drug for Black Patients (News release P05-32, (June 23, 2005)), at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01190.html. 
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and FDA regulations and guidance documents to assess where the uncertainties lie 
and how they can be clarifi ed.
Commercial problems no doubt seal the fate of many Scenario II discoveries. If a 
drug is only safe and effective for a narrow subpopulation, the remaining market may 
be too small to be of commercial interest. The needed TAB test may exist in the labo-
ratory but not yet be commercially available. When a targeting strategy is discovered 
late in clinical trials, further trials may be needed to verify that the drug is safe and 
effective in the targeted subpopulation. These trials may be unacceptably costly or may 
pose problems with remaining patent life, since only half the time spent performing 
human clinical trials is restored to a drug’s patent life under Hatch-Waxman.22
The legal literature on drug rescue23 has not fully addressed how hard it can be to 
draw valid statistical inferences from an earlier, negative clinical trial that has failed 
to establish hoped-for levels of safety and effectiveness in the trial population at 
large. Suppose a drug has been tested in a general population that included people 
with many different hair colors, and has produced good results in the subgroup of 
patients who are redheads. This does not prove that the drug is safe and effective for 
targeted use in redheads. The apparent association, which was spotted retrospectively 
after patients’ individual responses to the drug were known, may be pure coincidence. 
A new, prospective clinical trial in redheads is likely to be needed, to validate the 
suspected association. Selection bias and other research-design issues may make it 
impossible to draw statistically valid conclusions from the clinical trials that already 
took place. Drug rescue is not free, in the sense that a targeted therapy can simply be 
plucked from the sea of data already on hand. The costs of redeveloping a drug for 
use in a screened patient subpopulation may simply be too high to yield an economi-
cally viable targeted therapy.
As these challenges are better understood, policy solutions may be available. 
FDA already has work underway to develop guidelines for adaptive clinical trials, in 
which information about patient outcomes early in a clinical trial could be used to 
adjust later segments of the trial, while still maintaining a basis for good statistical 
decisions.24 Additional regulatory solutions may be needed for cases where target-
ing strategies are discovered late in clinical trials. For example, a special approval 
pathway—similar to FDA’s accelerated approval program25—could let such drugs 
be approved for targeted use based on a suspected gene-drug association, subject 
to postmarket study requirements to validate the targeting strategy. Size-of-market 
problems might be addressed through special incentives, such as an enhanced version 
of the orphan drug program26 for pharmacogenomic discoveries that doom a drug to 
a narrowly targeted future market. A special patent-term extension may be warranted 
for drugs that require a second round of clinical trials to validate a late-discovered 
targeting strategy. There also may be a role for direct public funding of research to 
complete the development of promising targeted therapies that are not commercially 
viable. The fi rst step is to develop a better practical understanding of what, exactly, 
22 35 U.S.C. § 156(g).
23 Rothstein & Epps, supra note 20; Binzak, supra note 20.
24 See, e.g., 2006 CONFERENCE ON ADAPTIVE TRIAL DESIGN (July 10, 2006), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/
speeches/2006/trialdesign0710.html. See, Presentation of Scott Gottlieb, Deputy Commissioner for Medical 
and Scientifi c Affairs, FDA.
25 21 C.F.R. Pt. 314, Subpt. H (§§ 314.500-314-560); Pt. 601, Subpt. E (§§ 601.40-601.46).
26 21 C.F.R. Pt. 316 (§§ 316.2 – 316.52).
evans.indd   759 11/14/06   1:08:32 PM
            Vol. 61760 Food and Drug Law Journal
is impeding the clinical translation of Scenario II discoveries, so that appropriate 
policy solutions can be crafted.
C. Barriers to Translation of Scenario III Discoveries (Discovery of a 
New Targeting Strategy after a Drug Is Approved)
Sledge has pointed out that any therapy that works must have a molecular target; 
untargeted drugs are merely the cases where scientists discovered the drug before they 
discovered the target.27 As already noted, there are many examples where variable patient 
responses to an older, marketed drug were later found to have a genetic explanation. 
This prevalence of postmarket (Scenario III) discoveries in pharmacogenomics may 
refl ect a pattern that will continue in the future or it may simply be a historical artifact. 
Academic scientists dominated pharmacogenomic research in its early years, and this 
may have focused pharmacogenomic studies on approved drugs, since approved drugs 
are in wide use and are readily available for academicians to study. This effect may have 
biased the early research in favor of Scenario III discoveries. As drug manufacturers 
increasingly take up the search for gene-drug interactions, and as pharmacogenomic 
studies are incorporated into earlier phases of the drug-development cycle, the preva-
lence of Scenario I and Scenario II discoveries may increase in coming years. However, 
Scenario III discoveries are likely to remain important, so long as regulations allow 
approval of drugs that exhibit signifi cant, unexplained variations in patient response. 
Everything that remains unknown about safety and effectiveness at the moment of 
drug approval—and that is quite a lot—serves as fodder for Scenario III discoveries. 
Moreover, some gene-drug interactions are rare and only show up when a drug is taken 
by large numbers of people—i.e., after drug approval.
FDA believes there is value in applying pharmacogenomic principles to older, 
marketed drugs to improve their risk-benefi t ratios by optimizing or individualizing 
dosing.28 However, it can be harder to change prescribing practices for an older drug 
than for a newer drug.29 With older drugs, clinicians may already have worked out pro-
cedures for coping with adverse side effects (e.g., using blood tests to monitor whether 
a patient’s white blood cell count is dropping too low). A new genetic test that predicts 
which patients are at risk for this side effect may offer an unclear cost/benefi t ratio, 
relative to the current procedures, and it may create new risks related to erroneous test 
results. The available clinical trial data may not be adequate to support a specifi c rec-
ommendation on how to adjust dosages for patients with different genotypes,30 and it 
may only be possible to give a general warning that patient response varies in response 
to genetic factors.
A separate set of problems—they could be called cooperation issues—may also be 
impeding the clinical introduction of new targeting strategies for already-approved 
drugs. These problems include, for example, a) legal and commercial barriers to 
cooperation among the multiple, separate parties that may hold intellectual property 
(IP) rights or other business and ownership interests in the drug, the targeting strat-
egy, and the TAB test; b) FDA’s unclear authority to require cross-labeling of TAB 
tests and drugs, in cases where this would force two separate manufacturers into 
27 Sledge, supra note 15, at 1614.
28 Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 3, at 767.
29 Id. at 768.
30 Id. at 767.
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an unwanted “marriage”; and c) opportunities for drug manufacturers to engage in 
strategic blocking behaviors, i.e., to obstruct development and regulatory clearance 
of new TAB tests, in cases where better targeting may erode the market share of an 
already-approved drug. These cooperation issues are explored in Section VI, infra, 
after necessary background has been laid.
III. PROBLEMS ASSESSING THE CLINICAL BENEFITS OF TAB TESTS AND 
TARGETED THERAPIES 
A. The Need for a Consensus Concept of Clinical Utility
TAB tests are intended for use in conjunction with drugs. This makes it diffi cult to 
characterize the clinical utility of the test, as distinguished from the utility of the drug 
itself or of the drug/test combination. Public comments on FDA’s 2005 concept paper on 
drug-test co-development31 sought a clearer defi nition of what “clinical utility” means 
in this context and expressed concern that different regulators and courts may assess 
the benefi ts of targeted therapies in different ways, e.g., for approving products, for 
approving Medicare reimbursements, and for defi ning the clinical standard of care.32
Inconsistent assessments of clinical benefi t can create confusion about the appropriate 
clinical use of TAB tests and may impede patients’ access to personalized medicine. 
Physicians and the public will face tough dilemmas, for example, if FDA has approved 
a TAB test, but insurers and Medicare decline to reimburse it. These dilemmas grow all 
the more complex if there are several competing tests for the same biomarker, particularly 
if there is scientifi c evidence suggesting that a newer, non-FDA-regulated test33 may be 
more reliable than an older, FDA-approved test. Appropriate use of screening tests will 
make drug-related injuries partially but never fully preventable, and causation of drug-
related injuries will be even more diffi cult to decipher than it is today (e.g., was an injury 
caused by the drug; by the test that erroneously indicated that the patient could safety 
take the drug; by the physician who failed to order the best available test for making 
that determination; or by the physician’s failure, after ordering an appropriate test that 
gave an accurate result, to draw correct conclusions about which drug to prescribe?). 
The clinical benefi ts of performing a test and, in particular, the relative benefi ts of using 
one test as opposed to another one, will be subject to considerable scientifi c uncertainty 
and the appropriate standard of care may be extremely diffi cult to discern at any point 
in time. Juries—without knowledge of statistics, genetics, or pharmacology—may be 
left to decide whether a physician should be held liable for prescribing the drug without 
fi rst ordering a particular test.
There is a critical need for appropriate, consensus methodologies to evaluate the 
incremental safety, therapeutic, and economic benefi ts of using TAB tests to target 
drugs and biologic therapies. These estimates will be needed to guide a wide variety 
of policy decisions in coming years (e.g., how much priority to place on pharmacoge-
nomic research and the development of new TAB tests; whether the use of particular 
31 HHS, FDA, Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper (Apr., 2005), supra note 13.
32 See, e.g., Letter from Robert Yocher, Genzyme Corp., to FDA (July 15, 2005), p. 2; Letter from Marie 
A. Vodicka, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), to FDA (July 19, 2005), p. 
9; Letter from Carolyn D. Jones, Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), to FDA (July 15, 
2005), p. 2. 
33 See discussion of non-FDA-regulated tests in Section IV, infra.
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TAB tests should be funded by governmental and private health plans; whether and 
when TAB testing should be incorporated into the standard of care; and when the use 
of a drug, without related TAB testing, should require informed consent or be grounds 
for malpractice liability). These estimates also are needed to support the development 
of suitable metrics of clinical performance, for use in assessing whether TAB tests are 
being appropriately applied so as to deliver their projected benefi ts.
B. Problems Applying Traditional Regulatory and Legal Standards to 
TAB Tests and Targeted Therapies
Traditional methods of assessing the safety, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness of 
new medical products may not accurately portray the benefi ts of TAB tests and may 
inject subtle biases into regulatory, insurance, and judicial decisions. An example of 
this phenomenon can be seen in FDA’s methods for assessing drug safety. The FDCA 
requires a drug to be “safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”34 This standard implies a risk-benefi t as-
sessment.35 Over the years, FDA and its counterparts in other nations participating in the 
International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) have developed standard methodolo-
gies for conducting this risk-benefi t analysis.36 As discussed below, these methodologies 
inject biases that may favor the approval of badly targeted drugs and preclude accurate 
assessment of the incremental benefi ts of a better-targeted therapy.
Figure 2 portrays outcomes experienced in a population of trial participants exposed to 
a hypothetical new drug. The horizontal axis depicts the population of trial participants 
and the frequency of various drug responses within that population; the vertical axis 
depicts the magnitude of patients’ benefi ts and harms. In this example, 10 percent of 
trial participants were adverse responders who suffered actual injuries, but no benefi ts, 
when they took the drug (see area in black at left). Sixty percent of participants were 
non-responders who neither benefi ted from, nor were directly injured by, the drug. 
The remaining 30 percent of trial participants experienced varying levels of therapeu-
tic benefi t (see vertically striped area). These people included 10 percent of the trial 
population who experienced a small benefi t but suffered some adverse side effects; 10 
percent who experienced small benefi ts without bad side effects; and 10 percent who 
received a large therapeutic benefi t from the drug.
Under the current FDA/ICH methodology, the drug’s risk-benefi t ratio would be 
calculated by comparing benefi ts (as measured by the striped areas in Figure 2) to harms 
(as measured by the areas in black). Non-response is implicitly refl ected in this ratio 
as a reduction in benefi ts (i.e., as a lack of effectiveness). However, non-response is 
not treated as a safety problem in its own right (i.e., as a factor that could itself result 
in patient injuries). As discussed further below, current FDA/ICH risk-benefi t meth-
odology treats non-response as an effectiveness problem, but not a safety problem. In 
fact, non-response may be both. There can be genuine harms associated with taking 
a drug that produces no therapeutic benefi t. Primarily, these are opportunity costs or 
34 FDCA § 505(d), 21 USC § 355(d).
35 Presentation by D.C. Throckmorton, Acting Deputy Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER), Effi cacy Biomarkers: Effi cacy/Risk Assessment (Oct. 6, 2005); see, also, FDA, CDER, 
CLINICAL REVIEW TEMPLATE (MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6010.3), Version 07/09/04, at 7.
36 International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), Guideline for Industry: Structure and Content 
of Clinical Study Reports (INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION E3) (July, 1996), at 35; HHS, FDA, 
Guidance for Industry: E2E Pharmacovigilance Planning (Apr., 2005), at 2.
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“lost-chance” 37 injuries, where the patient is hurt as a result of foregoing other thera-
peutic options that might have worked. Lost-chance injuries can be permanent and 
life-threatening, e.g., if the patient has a progressive disease such as cancer or diabetes, 
and other therapeutic options existed that might have halted the progression.
Current FDA/ICH risk-benefi t methodology calls for reviewers to distinguish adverse 
events that are attributable to progression of the underlying disease from adverse events 
that are caused by the drug itself. Only the latter harms are charged against a drug’s 
risk-benefi t ratio.38 This has the effect of undercounting harms associated with badly 
targeted drugs, by failing to penalize them for avoidable progression of the underlying 
disease (i.e., progression that occurs in patients whose failure to respond might have 
been predicted through the use of a TAB test). If a patient loses his foot because he was 
taking a badly targeted diabetes drug to which he did not respond, that injury would 
be chalked up to “progression of the underlying disease” and not counted as a risk 
related to taking that particular drug. Ignoring these harms undercounts the true risks 
and societal costs of badly targeted drugs. Current methodology treats non-response 
as a factor that affects the denominator of the risk-benefi t ratio, when in fact non-re-
sponse may affect both the numerator and the denominator. Stated otherwise, current 
methodology models non-responders as receiving zero benefi ts and zero harms, when 
in fact there may be harms.
37 “Lost-chance” doctrine, recognized in some U.S. states, allows injured patients to bring tort suits 
for injuries they have suffered as a result of progression of illness during a delay in diagnosis or negligent 
error in treatment. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Medical malpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages 
in Actions Based on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485 (1990, as updated). 
38 HHS, FDA, Reviewer Guidance: Conducting a Clinical Safety Review of a New Product Application 
and Preparing a Report on the Review (Feb., 2005), at 5-6, 8, 12, 14; see, also, FDA, MAPP 6010.3, supra 
note 35, at 20 (§§ 7.1, 7.1.5.5).
Figure 2
Two Dimensions of Safety & Effectiveness
Magnitude
of benefit
or harm
Frequency of response in the population
Mixed benefits and harms 
for 10% of patients. 
Small benefit for 10%. 
Large benefit for 10%.
No effect for 60%
Harms without 
benefit for 10%
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This approach can mask incremental advantages associated with better targeting 
of existing drugs. Targeted therapies offer two potential advantages over traditional, 
“untargeted” drugs: 1) “safety pharmacogenomics” seeks to identify genetic factors that 
expose patients to a heightened risk of adverse drug reactions—i.e., injuries directly 
caused by ingestion of the drug—so that at-risk patients can be advised to avoid the 
drug; 2) “effectiveness pharmacogenomics” seeks to reduce the rate of treatment fail-
ure—i.e., to reduce the rate of non-response by screening out patients who would fail 
to derive therapeutic benefi t from the drug. In practice, targeting strategies may achieve 
a combination of these two effects.
The current FDA/ICH risk-benefi t methodology would accurately portray the advan-
tages of a targeting strategy that works strictly by means of safety pharmacogenomics. 
Such a strategy reduces direct, drug-caused injuries of the type FDA/ICH methodol-
ogy includes in the risk-benefi t ratio. The targeted drug would display lower risks, and 
hence would have more attractive risk-benefi t ratio, than the corresponding, untargeted 
version of the same drug. However, the FDA/ICH methodology displays only some of 
the advantages associated with effectiveness pharmacogenomics. As non-responding 
patients are screened out, a larger percentage of remaining patients who do take the 
drug will experience therapeutic benefi ts, so the targeted drug will display advantages 
in this respect. However, there is an additional advantage that the current methodology 
fails to capture: the targeted drug reduces lost-chance injuries caused by progression 
of the underlying disease in non-responders. These injuries were excluded from con-
sideration, when calculating the risk-benefi t ratio of the original, untargeted drug. The 
fact that the targeted version of the drug reduces those injuries would, therefore, not 
be visible as an advantage. The full merits of a better-targeted drug are systematically 
understated by the current methodology.
This approach may have been acceptable in the mid-twentieth century, when there 
was no way to predict which patients would or would not respond to a given drug. The 
phenomenon of non-response merits a more thorough analysis, to the degree that science 
now offers opportunities to target drugs in ways that could reduce these lost-chance 
injuries. How well a drug can be targeted is now a factor to be considered as part of its 
overall safety-and-effectiveness profi le. The incremental safety and economic benefi ts of 
better targeted drugs cannot be appreciated, if regulators undercount the harms of badly 
targeted drugs. Precise targeting is a safety feature, akin to airbags in a car; regulatory 
decisions would be skewed if automotive safety statistics simply ignored the types of 
injuries that occur when cars lack airbags. The advent of targeted therapies calls for a 
rethinking of drug regulators’ old, pre-pharmacogenomic methodologies for assessing 
benefi t and risk.
The example just given is simply that: a single example. Similar biases may exist 
in applying other common legal standards to TAB tests and targeted therapies. Such 
standards include: 1) regulatory standards for medical products and services, such 
as FDA’s standards for approving products and standards under the Clinical Labora-
tory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)39 for laboratory testing services; 2) 
reimbursement standards, such as “reasonable and necessary” concepts used in U.S. 
Medicare, Medicaid, and insurance reimbursement decisions and the cost-effectiveness 
standards other nations employ when deciding which treatments should be covered by 
their national health plans; and 3) standards of clinical care, patient protection, and 
tort liability, including state laws and court decisions on informed consent, medical 
practice standards, medical product liability, and physician malpractice in the use of 
39 Pub.L. 100-578, (Oct. 31, 1988), 102 Stat. 2903, codifi ed at 42 U.S.C. § 263a et seq.; see regulations 
at 42 C.F.R. Pt. 493.
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drugs. For all such standards, there is a need to evaluate how they apply in the specifi c 
context of targeted therapies and whether existing methodologies may bias day-to-day 
decisions by regulators, legislators, insurance administrators, healthcare providers, and 
product developers. Key questions are: 1) What are the specifi c problems in applying 
existing legal and regulatory standards to TAB tests and targeted therapies (e.g., are 
necessary data inputs unavailable, or does the methodology make assumptions that are 
questionable, in the case of a targeted therapy)? and 2) How can each such problem 
be addressed (e.g., by developing new regulatory guidance to clarify how an existing 
standard should be applied when analyzing a TAB test, by supplementing state informed 
consent statutes to address uncertainties, etc.)? Targeted therapies cannot achieve their 
full promise, if existing legal and regulatory standards are applied in ways that tend to 
mask their real advantages.
C. Coping with Uncertainty about the Benefi ts of TAB Testing
The incremental benefi ts of TAB testing and better-targeted therapies are, to some 
degree, unknowable—at least, they may not be discoverable through the clinical tri-
als that have been the traditional basis for regulatory product approvals. The current 
shortcut of treating non-response to a drug as “zero benefi t/zero harm” (see Section 
III.B supra) may simply refl ect how devilishly hard it is to quantify the harms that 
fl ow from a patient’s use of an ineffective treatment. These injuries are consequential 
rather than direct. Estimating these injuries would require a comparison of probable 
health outcomes for alternative courses of treatment, or require prognostication of how 
patients’ illness may progress during a given period of non-response to a drug. Regu-
lators have traditionally, and understandably, been hesitant to dwell on imponderable 
questions such as these. The issue, now, is whether appropriate regulation of targeted 
therapies will force these questions onto the regulatory agenda. The answer is, “Not 
necessarily.” Regulators cannot be expected to answer questions that, inherently, have 
no clear answers. However, if that is the case, our laws and regulatory policies may 
need to be adjusted to make allowance for the fact that the decisions regulators make 
about targeted therapies will be prone to considerable error and uncertainty. Uncertainty 
itself is not a problem, so long as appropriate allowances are made for the fact of that 
uncertainty. Coping with uncertainty may be the defi ning regulatory challenge of the 
pharmacogenomic era.
The incremental benefi t of a targeted therapy depends on extrinsic factors, e.g., in-
formation about drugs other than the one that is under review, the nature of the patient’s 
medical condition, and how it may progress if not successfully treated. If no alternative 
therapies are available, then arguably there is no harm in trying an ineffective drug, other 
than the economic waste. If the patient’s condition is non-progressive, then trying an 
ineffective treatment produces no permanent injury, although it may cause prolongation 
of suffering (e.g., a codeine non-metabolizing patient suffers ongoing pain until switch-
ing to another drug, which then stops the pain). The harm non-responders suffer also 
depends on how long it takes to detect the lack of response (e.g., is it necessary to wait 
until cancer returns to infer that a treatment has been ineffective, or are there surrogate 
biomarkers of effectiveness that would let this conclusion be drawn earlier?).
In approving new drugs, FDA currently considers some of these extrinsic factors, 
including the presence and adequacy of alternative treatments and the seriousness 
and outcome of the disease that is being treated.40 Such factors play into a qualitative 
40 HHS, FDA, Statement Regarding the Demonstrations of Effectiveness of Human Drug Products, 60 
Fed. Reg. 39,180 (Aug. 1, 1995). 
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assessment, by FDA’s reviewers and Advisory Committees, of the overall accept-
ability of a drug’s risk-benefi t ratio, but FDA is not required to conduct a compre-
hensive, systematic, or quantitative analysis of these factors. A more systematic and 
transparent decision algorithm may be needed in the case of targeted therapies, to 
ensure that the incremental advantages of various targeting strategies are adequately 
considered in FDA’s decisions; to promote better public understanding of the fact that 
individual treatment response may be quite variable; to ensure that the interests of 
various subgroups of patients (responders, non-responders, and adverse responders) 
are treated even-handedly as FDA balances risks to some patients against benefi ts 
to others; to ensure that no genetically defi ned subgroup of patients is having its 
interests systematically and repeatedly neglected by drug developers or FDA; and to 
ensure that similar factors are being weighed in a consistent manner when approving 
similarly situated products.
Accepting how diffi cult it may be to estimate the lost-chance injuries that non-
responding patients suffer, available regulatory resources may need to be focused on 
products where this risk of harm is highest. One possible approach would be to use 
a risk-stratifi cation algorithm to help identify situations where a cautious analysis is 
most warranted. For each drug under review, this might mean compiling a chart in the 
form of Figure 2, supra, showing the frequency of benefi cial response, non-response, 
and adverse response to the drug. For drugs with signifi cant rates of non-response, 
regulators might then estimate the probability that non-response could actually cause 
serious, preventable injuries. This probability would depend on many factors, and the 
factors may differ for different classes of drug. Examples of the factors might include: 
1) whether the condition being treated is progressive or non-progressive in nature; 2) 
how serious are the potential consequences of non-response to the drug (e.g., suicide in 
a non-responding depression patient, vs. prolonging a patient’s cold for three additional 
days); 3) whether alternative therapies exist, such that non-responding patients would 
actually be foregoing other therapeutic options during treatment with the drug that is 
under review; 4) whether timely detection of non-response and adverse response is 
possible; 5) whether good options are available for mitigating the injuries that may 
result from non-response or adverse response to the drug; and 6) whether the drug 
will be used in a population that would have diffi culty communicating non-response 
(e.g., infants or speech-impaired patients who would be unable to express that a pain 
medication is not working).
A risk-stratifi cation algorithm of this sort can improve the quality of regulatory 
decisions, even if aspects of the analysis must remain qualitative and uncertain. 
Getting this algorithm right will be a key challenge drug regulators may face in an 
era of targeted therapies. At issue is whether a badly targeted therapy should be ap-
proved “as is,” or are the risks to non-responders so serious that approval should be 
deferred until a better targeting strategy is identifi ed. The decision either way has 
major commercial and public-health consequences. A countervailing concern is that 
requiring drugs to be targeted too precisely may delay or deny therapeutic benefi ts 
to many patients who could safely ingest a drug, to protect a narrow subgroup that is 
particularly susceptible to injury.
FDA is now entering a diffi cult decisional terrain where its approval decisions 
may entail interpersonal trade-offs among respective subgroups of its statutorily 
protected class, i.e., patients. Pharmacogenomics upends the simplifying assumption 
that all patients have an equal ex ante probability of enjoying a benefi t or suffering 
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harm from a given drug. Drug-approval decisions in the era of targeted therapies pit 
the interests of various patient subgroups directly against one another. People whose 
livers are endowed with good genetic machinery for manufacturing drug-metaboliz-
ing enzymes may press for rapid approval of drugs that threaten to kill persons not 
so blessed. Other federal agencies, e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), have previously had to oc-
cupy this diffi cult terrain, where an agency’s decisions may visit disparate impacts 
within the broader public it is seeking to protect. Industrial and residential electricity 
consumers may be differentially affected by a FERC rate-approval decision; so may 
FDA confront diffi cult confl icts within the larger class of drug-consuming patients. A 
possible trend to watch is whether, in this climate, FDA’s decisions (and its decisional 
algorithms) may become subject to as much scholarly critique and judicial review 
as has been characteristic of EPA and FERC decisions in earlier years. Pharmacoge-
nomics fractures the public into differently situated subclasses, and a divided public 
sharpens regulatory decisionmaking.
Despite efforts to improve FDA’s methodologies for assessing the clinical benefi ts of 
targeted therapies, there will be a certain amount of ongoing, irresolvable uncertainty 
about the incremental benefi ts TAB tests and targeted therapies provide. The impact of 
this uncertainty, and the appropriate policy response to it, both are poorly understood 
at present: 1) how may uncertainty about the clinical utility of targeted therapies skew 
decisions by regulators, insurers, and courts? and  2) are there appropriate ways to 
mitigate these biases? For example, if the benefi ts of TAB testing cannot be accurately 
assessed, it may be appropriate to adjust tort liability standards so that physicians are 
not held to a higher standard of care than can be factually supported. If current drug and 
reimbursement approvals are biased in favor of badly targeted therapies, then offsetting 
policies may be needed, to level the playing fi eld and promote timely clinical introduc-
tion of better targeted drugs. Such policies could include: special incentives to spur 
the development, reimbursement, and use of targeted therapies; expedited regulatory 
approval pathways to speed approval of targeted therapies that combine drugs and TAB 
tests; or reduced FDA evidentiary requirements for initial approval of TAB tests and 
targeted therapies, subject to postmarket study requirements to clarify uncertainty.
Rough estimation techniques may be able to provide partial information about the 
benefi ts of TAB testing, even when full estimation is impossible. These techniques might 
harness postmarket drug-safety data and clinical outcomes data to give a better sense 
of the harms that fl ow from badly targeted drugs. All who have an interest in accurate 
regulatory information will benefi t from frank, transparent recognition of the biases that 
may exist, when information is imperfect. Potential benefi ciaries include policymak-
ers, regulators, healthcare providers, insurers, juries, and, in particular, physicians and 
patients who need to understand limitations of the regulatory processes on which they 
are relying for protection.
IV. REGULATORY APPROVAL OF TAB TESTS
A. The Current Regulatory Approval Status of TAB Tests and Issues 
with Adverse Event Reporting and Informed Consent
An important concern with TAB tests, as with all other genetic tests, is to protect 
patients from unreliable tests and excessive claims about what the tests can do. There 
is broad consensus about the need for some form of regulatory review to substanti-
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ate claims that will be made about a genetic test, before allowing its use in clinical 
settings.41 Many genetic tests now in use have not been through this sort of review 
process—a fact of which many patients, and some physicians, are unaware. The United 
States has pursued a bifurcated policy that requires regulatory review of safety and 
effectiveness for some, but not all, genetic and diagnostic tests.
This situation refl ects longstanding differences in the regulation of test products 
and testing services. FDA regulates in vitro diagnostic (IVD) devices, or test kits, that 
medical device manufacturers make for sale to clinical laboratories. These test kits, 
with limited exceptions, must pass through FDA’s premarket clearance or approval 
processes, which require information to support analytical and clinical claims (if 
clinical claims are being made). An example of an analytical claim would be that a 
test detects a biomarker and does so with specifi ed rates of false positives and nega-
tives. Clinical claims could be that this biomarker is a valid indicator of a particular 
health condition (e.g., whether the patient is able to metabolize a particular drug, or 
whether the patient has a particular type of cancer) or that the test has utility in clinical 
care (e.g., to screen patients to reduce injuries from a specifi c drug). FDA requires 
substantiation before a TAB test kit can be marketed with these types of claims.
On the other hand, tests made in-house at clinical laboratories, colloquially known 
as “home-brew” tests, are regulated under CLIA.42 Home-brew tests traditionally 
have not had to pass through an external regulatory review process to substantiate 
claims, although they generally do receive internal validation by the labs that made 
them. A lab cannot sell its home-brew tests for use by others but can use them itself 
to provide testing services to the public. There recently have been calls to enhance 
CLIA regulation by adding a genetic testing specialty in which labs could qualify.43 
However, this would not alter the basic fact that CLIA has no mechanism for external 
regulatory review of home-brew tests.
In principle, FDA has the authority to require data demonstrating the safety and 
effectiveness of home-brew tests. However, FDA has, in recent years, declined to do 
so in an exercise of its enforcement discretion.44 In September 2006, FDA issued draft 
guidance indicating that one type of home-brew tests, in vitro diagnostic multivari-
ate index assays (IVDMIAs), must meet pre- and postmarket device requirements 
under the FDCA and FDA regulations, including, when applicable, premarket review 
41 Francis S. Collins & Alan E. Guttmacher, Genetics Moves Into the Medical Mainstream, 286 JAMA 
2322 (2001); David Melzer, Don Detmer & Ron Zimmern, Pharmacogenetics and Public Policy: Expert 
Views In Europe and North America, 4 PHARMACOGENETICS 689 (2003); David Melzer, Ron L. Zimmern, Don 
E. Detmer & Tom Ling, Regulatory Options for Pharmacogenetics, 4 PHARMACOGENOMICS 527 (2003). 
42 See supra note 39.
43 HHS, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Notice of Intent; Genetic Testing Under 
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,928 (May 4, 2000); Genetic Alliance, 
Genetic Alliance Calls for Genetic Testing Specialty Under CLIA (Mar. 2, 2005), at http://www.genetical-
liance.org/ws_display.asp?fi lter=clia_release; Juli Murphy, Gail Javitt, & Kathy Hudson, Creating a Genetic 
Testing Specialty Under CLIA: What Are We Waiting For? (Johns Hopkins University, Genetics and Public 
Policy Center, 2005), at http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy/regulations/McClellanpaper.pdf.
44 See Steven Gutman, Clinical Chemistry Forum: The Role of Food and Drug Administration Regulation 
of In Vitro Diagnostic Devices—Applications to Genetics, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 746 (1999); HHS, FDA, 
Final Rule, Medical Devices; Classifi cation/Reclassifi cation; Restricted Devices; Analyte Specifi c Reagents, 
62 Fed. Reg. 62,243, 62,249 (Nov. 21, 1997).  See, also, Richard D. Schifreen & Cynthia Louth, Industry 
View on the Regulation of Ancillary Reagents, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155, 159 (1996).
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requirements for class II and III devices.45 IVDMIAs typically employ complex 
mathematical algorithms, often with the aid of computer software, to interpret large 
amounts of genetic or protein data to yield results that can be used to guide medical 
decisionmaking.46 These tests include some of the complex genetic and proteomic 
tests, such as tests that analyze breast-tumor genes to assess whether a particular 
patient might benefi t from chemotherapy, that are expected to play an important role 
in personalized medicine.47 However, many TAB tests do not fall within the defi nition 
of an IVDMIA. The recent draft guidance is one discrete step toward enhanced FDA 
oversight of home-brew tests.
There have been calls for FDA to assume an even greater role in oversight of home-
brew genetic tests. In 1997, a joint National Institutes of Health (NIH)—Department 
of Energy (DOE) task force recommended systematic, well-designed studies to assess 
the safety and effectiveness of genetic tests before they become routinely available and 
after they undergo signifi cant modifi cations.48 Three years later, the Secretary’s Advi-
sory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT) called for FDA to assume responsibility 
for premarket review, approval, and labeling of all new genetic tests that have moved 
beyond the basic research stage.49 SACGT envisioned data-driven reviews focusing 
on the analytical and clinical validity of genetic tests, as well as on any claims the 
developer plans to make about a test’s clinical utility.50 Despite these recommendations, 
it is likely that many types of CLIA- and FDA-regulated tests will remain subject to 
different approval standards for the immediately foreseeable future.
Debate about appropriate reforms in this area has been clouded by lack of good, 
basic data clarifying the number of home-brew TAB tests available and the potential 
risks they pose. The scant data that are available tend to refl ect diagnostic testing or 
genetic testing in general, with very little information specifi cally addressing TAB 
tests used in targeting of therapies (Box 1). Information about FDA-approved TAB 
tests is readily available, but there is no single, good source of data on how many 
CLIA-regulated TAB tests are offered and how widely they are being used in clini-
cal decisionmaking. Grant-making entities such as the NIH should consider funding 
empirical studies of these matters. Potential sources of data could include physician 
surveys, surveys of clinical laboratories, and even insurance claims data. There is 
also a need for improved public disclosure of the internal review processes clinical 
laboratories use in validating home-brew TAB tests. CLIA-regulated tests receive 
some form of internal review by the labs that developed them; however, details often 
are treated as confi dential business information, making it hard to judge how rigor-
ous these review procedures are. Without more information, it is diffi cult to assess 
45 HHS, FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry, Clinical Laboratories, and FDA Staff on In Vitro Diagnostic 
Multivariate Index Assays [Docket No. 2006D-0347] (Sept. 5, 2006), at www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/
98fr/ch0641.pdf. 
46 FDA, FDA Drafts Regulatory Guidance to Industry and Labs for Group of Medical Tests, (News 
release P06-127, (Sept. 5, 2006)), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01445.html. 
47 Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Seeks to Regulate New Types of Diagnostic Tests, THE NY TIMES, n.p. (Sept. 
6, 2006).
48 NIH—DOE Task Force on Genetic Testing, supra note 5, at ch. 2. 
49 NIH, SACGT, supra note 5, see Executive Summary at x.
50 Id. at x, 15—20.
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how serious should be the concern about the clinical use of home-brew TAB tests to 
direct patient care.
Box 1: Regulatory Approval Status of Currently Available Tests
In addition to having no mechanism for external review of the validity and utility of 
tests, CLIA also lacks the postmarket vigilance and adverse-event reporting mechanisms 
that FDA’s regulations provide.58 To date, there have been few documented cases where 
51 ADVAMED SUBMISSIONS WORKSHOP (July 18, 2000); see, Presentation of D.W. Feigal, Jr., Center for 
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), Future Trends, at: http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/present/hima-7-19-
00-feigal.pdf. See Sl. 21—23.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 National Academy of Sciences, National Cancer Policy Board, Board on Science, Technology, and 
Economic Policy, SAVING WOMEN’S LIVES: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING BREAST CANCER DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS 
225 (2005), at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11016.html.
55 Id.
56 Enterprise Analysis Corporation, Molecular Diagnostics—An In-depth Survey of the U.S. Molecular 
Diagnostic Laboratories (Nov. 2003), at http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/310296. 
57 FDA, FDA Clears First of Kind Genetic Lab Test (News release PO4-111, (Dec. 23, 2004)). 
58 21 CFR 806 (providing for reporting of corrective changes made in medical devices and removals 
of devices from the market); 21 CFR 803 (establishing requirements for medical device reporting).
Data on Genetic Tests of All Types. Data for the year 2000 indicated that at least 
301 clinical or research genetic tests were offered in the U.S.,52 with 158 laboratories 
offering clinical tests;53 however, only six specifi c genetic tests had been cleared or 
approved by FDA.54 These fi gures refer not only to TAB tests, but to genetic tests 
of all types, such as tests for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. BRCA 
tests are widely used to predict patients’ future risk of breast and ovarian cancer, 
even though no BRCA test has ever been approved by FDA.55 As of 2003, an NIH-
contracted resource for genetic tests was reportedly offering more than 1,000 genetic 
tests, of which only 6 had been brought before FDA for approval.56 A 2003 survey of 
U.S. molecular diagnostics laboratories found that genetic testing was their second-
largest activity, after infectious disease testing, in terms of the volume of molecular 
diagnostics tests they performed; 85 percent of the labs surveyed reported using at 
least one home-brew test.57 
Data on TAB Tests. In the subgroup of TAB tests, only a handful of FDA-reviewed 
tests now exists. For example, in 1998, FDA approved the fi rst molecular diagnostic 
test for use in detecting the HER-2 protein, which is the target for the breast-cancer 
biologic therapy, trastuzumab (HerceptinTM), and FDA has subsequently approved 
a test for this protein based on FISH technology. FDA also has cleared a test for 
genetic variations in HIV virus, for use in selecting appropriate therapies. It was 
not until December, 2004 that FDA cleared a drug-metabolizing enzyme genotyp-
ing system, designed for use in detecting a patient’s cytochrome P450 genotype.58 
In August, 2005, FDA cleared a second test of this type, for use in detecting varia-
tions in the UGT1A1 gene that encodes the enzyme UDP-glucoronosyltransferase, 
which affects metabolism of irenotecan. The arsenal of FDA-reviewed TAB tests 
is still quite small.
evans.indd   770 11/14/06   1:08:35 PM
2006 771CLINICAL BENEFITS OF PHARMACOGENOMICS
patients experienced harm because of errors in a CLIA-regulated genetic test.59 However, 
the lack of reports gives little comfort, in the absence of any reporting requirement. Ap-
propriate reporting systems need to be developed for adverse events associated with the 
clinical use of CLIA-regulated TAB tests, even if other issues with CLIA regulation are 
deferred for later resolution. Key questions are: 1) what should constitute a reportable 
adverse event in the context of TAB testing and targeted therapies? and 2) what are the 
most workable mechanisms for reporting these events?  The latter mechanisms might 
include voluntary reporting by physicians or more formal reporting requirements for 
physicians and/or clinical laboratories.
Only rarely will the test itself cause patient injury; in many cases, testing requires only 
a minimally invasive blood draw or sampling of tissue. Yet patients may suffer serious 
adverse reactions to drugs they take based on inaccurate test results (or test results that are 
accurate, but erroneously understood and applied by the clinician). Lack of effectiveness 
in a TAB test becomes a safety problem in its own right, if it translates into serious or 
fatal drug-related injuries. The question is how these injuries should be reported—as a 
drug-related event, as a test-related event, or both. It is diffi cult, with a targeted therapy, 
to distinguish whether an adverse event was caused by the drug or by the (mis)targeting 
of the drug. Accepting that this diffi culty will always exist, a consistent approach to 
reporting is crucial. If some of these events are attributed to the drug, while others are 
attributed to problems with a test or in the use of test results, it will not be possible to 
assemble a true picture of why patients are being injured and whether such injuries 
could be prevented through better use of existing test procedures. The objective should 
be to bring data about FDA- and CLIA-regulated TAB tests together with data about 
the drugs they target and the clinical outcomes these drugs produce, so that there is a 
single source of useful information to guide clinicians in day-to-day decisions to order 
tests and prescribe medicines. For drugs with known or suspected genetic variability of 
patient response, adverse-event reports may need to include information about whether 
a TAB test was performed at all and, if so, which specifi c test was used; what the test 
result was; and whether the clinician’s decision to prescribe the drug was in line with 
the current understanding of which drugs are appropriate for patients with similar test 
results. This level of detail is needed to support future improvements in drug targeting: 
e.g., are injuries traced to a failure to use available tests; are injuries higher with one 
test as opposed to another; do there appear to be problems in defi ning the range of test 
results that corresponds to a patient’s having a good response to a drug; or is the problem 
that clinicians are taking inappropriate actions in response to test results? How to fi x 
the problems depends on what the problems are, and it is essential to develop reporting 
mechanisms that capture the needed information.
Home-brew TAB tests also may present informed consent issues. The laws of all U.S. 
states require informed consent for medical therapy, but not all states clearly require 
informed consent to the use of diagnostic tests.60 However, TAB tests have a very direct 
infl uence on therapeutic decisions, and the validity of a patient’s consent to medical 
therapy becomes questionable, if that consent was ill informed by faulty TAB testing. 
Uncertainties inherent in TAB testing arguably need to be disclosed as part of the treat-
ment consent, even if state law does not require a separate diagnostic consent to the test 
itself. In particular, patients may regard it as material and want to know whether they are 
basing important treatment decisions on a TAB test that has never been reviewed by an 
external regulator. TAB testing is serious business with serious medical consequences. 
59 E.g., a lawsuit settled out of court, after several children were born with Tay-Sachs disease after 
their parents were erroneously characterized by a home-brew carrier-screening test. 
60 W.J. Curran, M.A. Hall, M.A. Bobinski, D. Orentlicher, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS (5th ed., 1998), 
at 234-235 (noting that state informed consent statutes are not always clear whether disclosure of diagnostic 
alternatives, as opposed to treatment alternatives, is required). 
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A patient may be denied life-saving cancer therapy based on a TAB test that indicates 
the patient is not a suitable candidate for a targeted cancer drug. A patient may receive 
a drug that has lethal side effects, if a TAB test erroneously indicates that the patient 
will be a good metabolizer of that drug.
State informed consent statutes need to clarify situations in which TAB testing should 
be addressed as part of the medical treatment consent discussion. These situations could 
include those where a patient is making treatment decisions about a serious or life-
threatening disease or is facing treatment with a drug that is known to produce serious 
side effects in some patients. Possible approaches, in these situations, might be: 1) to 
inform the patient whether TAB tests exist that may aid in the selection of drugs for 
treating their condition or in reducing the rate of adverse events associated with those 
drugs; 2) to inform the patient whether available TAB tests have received external regu-
latory review; and 3) if the available tests have not received external regulatory review, 
to inform the patient about possible uncertainty of test results and the available options 
for addressing that uncertainty (e.g., confi rm test results using another available TAB 
test, adjust the initial drug dosage until the patient’s response can be assessed, monitor 
the patient to ensure early detection of adverse reactions, etc.).
The modern trend among states is toward a patient-centered standard of disclosure 
(i.e., information should be disclosed if patients would regard it as material to their deci-
sions)61 and this trend also is refl ected in standards published by the American Medical 
Association62 and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.63 
At the federal level, FDA requires that the non-approved status of a home-brew test 
be disclosed to physicians, in cases where the test incorporates an FDA-regulated ana-
lyte-specifi c reagent.64 However, home-brew tests that were made with other chemicals 
require no such disclosure. This creates an ironic situation where tests that have had the 
least amount of FDA scrutiny are subject to the lowest disclosure requirements. Empiri-
cal studies are needed, to assess whether patients and physicians are ill informed about 
the regulatory approval status of home-brew tests, and whether patients regard this as 
61 See, e.g., Curran et al., Id. at 217-221; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); P.H. 
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE LAW J. 889, 900-905 (1994).
62 AMA, E-8.08 INFORMED CONSENT, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print8488.html.
63 JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (AUG. 3, 
2004), Standard RI.2.40, Elements of Performance for RI.2.40, at p. RI-11.
64 21 CFR §§ 809.10(e)(1)(x),(xi); 809.30(c),(d)(2),(d)(3),(e). 
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a material factor about which they would wish to be informed when making decisions 
about the use of targeted therapies.
B. Optimizing Regulatory Review of TAB Tests: The Problem of 
Distinguishing Regulation of Medical Products from Regulation 
of Medical Practice
To address the disparity in review requirements for FDA- and CLIA-regulated tests, 
two key variables can be adjusted: a) the intensity of review (i.e., how many aspects 
of test performance must be externally substantiated before a test is allowed in clinical 
use?), and b) the scope of regulatory coverage (i.e., how many and what types of tests 
will be subjected to this review process?).
Figure 3 is a schematic of current U.S. policy on premarket review of genetic tests. 
FDA-regulated in vitro diagnostic products receive intense review to substantiate 
claims made about analytical validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility. (Refer to 
Section IV.A supra for examples of such claims.) However, regulatory coverage is 
limited, since CLIA-regulated tests are not generally subject to these same review 
requirements. SACGT’s recommendations in 2000 called on FDA to assume responsi-
bility for review, approval, and labeling of all genetic tests, with FDA’s review focus-
ing on analytical and clinical validity as well as on any claims the developer plans 
to make about a test’s clinical utility.65 This would amount to adding check marks 
across the bottom row of Figure 3, maintaining the current intensity of FDA review 
but expanding the regulatory coverage. The recent FDA draft guidance on IVDMIAs 
would achieve this effect for that particular class of home-brew tests.66 SACGT’s 
recommendations were controversial and, to date, have not been implemented. There 
are merits on either side of the issue. Subjecting home-brew tests to a more intensive 
review would promote a level playing fi eld and perhaps promote greater investment 
in TAB-test research by FDA-regulated manufacturers. However, some in the industry 
are concerned that intensive FDA review of home-brew genetic tests could reduce 
the number and types of tests available, delay the clinical introduction of new tests, 
and increase costs.
One way to address these concerns would be to extend regulatory coverage to all 
tests, but reduce the intensity of FDA review for all tests. This is shown in Figure 4. 
Test kits and home-brew tests both would receive external regulatory review, but the 
review would concentrate on analytical validity and perhaps some, but not all, clinical 
claims. Remaining aspects of clinical validity and utility would be treated as medical 
practice issues, and oversight would come primarily from agencies that regulate medi-
cal practice or from within the medical profession itself. Admittedly, any proposal 
to reduce the intensity of FDA review seems controversial, at a time when FDA is 
under pressure to increase its oversight of safety issues after last year’s problems with 
late-discovered risks in COX-2 painkillers. However, reducing the intensity of FDA 
review of genetic and diagnostic tests need not imply that the clinical utility of these 
tests would be left wholly unregulated. Rather, it would mean creating alternative 
institutional arrangements for validating the clinical utility of these tests.
65 NIH, SACGT, supra note 5, at x, 15 – 20.
66 FDA, supra note 45.
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The approach shown in Figure 4 may be particularly appropriate in the context of 
TAB testing, even if it is not adopted for other types of genetic tests and in vitro diag-
nostic products more generally. TAB tests present diffi cult problems in drawing the line 
between regulation of medical products and regulation of medical practice. Because 
TAB tests are intended for use in directing treatment decisions, these tests have an im-
mediate and inevitable linkage to the clinical practice of medicine. Bad TAB tests will 
not merely leave patients suffering social and psychological harms of being wrongly 
tagged with a stigmatizing genetic condition. Rather, bad tests may cause patients to 
receive drugs that will be toxic for them, or to be denied drugs that might have saved 
their lives. It is true, of course, that other types of genetic test also affect patient-care 
decisions: e.g., a positive genetic test for familial adenomatous polyposis may cause 
a patent to opt for more frequent colon-cancer screening. However, for TAB tests, the 
linkage to treatment decisions is prompt, consistent, and direct. Moreover, the safety 
and effectiveness of a TAB test may depend as much on how the test is applied in 
day-to-day clinical use, as on factors that can be assessed during premarket regulatory 
review. The fact that a patient has been tested with an FDA-reviewed genetic test is 
no guarantee that the test procedure has clinical validity or utility, if the test is being 
used for a purpose other than its FDA-approved indication. For example, a physician 
might order a test of a patient’s cystic fi brosis gene carrier status, on the theory that this 
information has relevance in selecting an appropriate chemotherapy for the patient’s 
colon cancer. Even if FDA has established that this test is valid in its intended use—i.e., 
to determine whether a person carries a copy of the cystic fi brosis gene for purposes 
of reproductive planning—the test would not necessarily have any clinical validity or 
utility in this off-label use. FDA traditionally has declined to restrict off-label uses of 
the products it approves.67 Ensuring the clinical validity and utility of TAB tests may 
require tighter control of clinical applications than FDA traditionally has exerted in 
connection with its regulated products.
67 Dep’t of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW), FDA, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescrip-
tion Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration (Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503-16,505 (July 30, 1972). 
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In carrying out its responsibilities under the FDCA, FDA has steered a careful course 
between regulation of medical products and regulation of medical practice. The legisla-
tive debate of the late 1930s, before passage of the FDCA, focused considerable attention 
on the proper scope of federal power to regulate medical practice, which had traditionally 
been a matter for state regulation.68 Congress made clear that by passing the FDCA, it 
did not intend to authorize broad FDA regulation of the practice of medicine.69 Courts 
have not found constitutional limits on FDA’s power to regulate physicians,70 but the 
agency, as a matter of policy, has sought to avoid direct regulation of their activities.71 
For example, FDA has stated “labeling is not intended either to preclude the physician 
from using his best judgment in the interest of his patient, or to impose liability if he 
does not follow the package insert.”72 Under this policy, FDA regulates the claims made 
by test developers but does not regulate the claims physicians make about a test. The 
problem with TAB tests is that these latter claims, quite often, are the key to the test’s 
safety and effectiveness.
TAB tests pose a regulatory dilemma: their clinical utility may be indeterminate, 
without specifying in considerable detail how they will be used in the clinic. The ques-
tion, then, is which regulator(s) should be responsible for overseeing the clinical utility 
of TAB tests? Before defi ning FDA’s role with respect to this question, there needs to 
be a studied analysis of what the product/practice distinction means in the context of 
pharmacogenomics and personalized medicine. In particular, will ensuring the clinical 
utility of TAB tests require restrictions on off-label use that go beyond FDA’s traditional 
policies on this matter? If so, effective oversight of the clinical utility of TAB tests by 
FDA could place the agency in a legally problematic role of regulating medical practice. 
Further, it may imply infl exible federal restrictions on off-label use of TAB tests that 
could deny patients the therapeutic benefi ts that many off-label uses do provide.73 Is 
this what it will take and, if so, is this what we want?
Protecting the public from faulty targeting of medicines, while preserving the crucial 
distinction between product and practice regulation, may require careful sharing of 
oversight responsibilities among FDA, state medical boards, the scientifi c community, 
and the medical profession itself. Some of the genetic testing policy recommendations 
of the past decade, including those by SACGT, arguably would blur this distinction if 
the recommendations were applied to TAB tests. Appropriate regulatory structures for 
TAB tests must take account of special issues that arise because of the close linkage 
these tests have to clinical decisionmaking and because knowledge of how to target 
therapies is continuously and rapidly evolving. Traditional methods of incorporating 
scientifi c and medical advice into regulatory decisions may be too cumbersome or too 
slow to keep up. It ultimately may be necessary to develop new processes or even new 
regulatory institutions (formal or informal) to share in the work of validating TAB tests 
and targeted therapies.
68 Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS 
OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS (David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper 
& Jonathan S. Kahan eds., (1999)) at 17-24.
69 HEW, FDA, supra note 67, 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,503-16,504.
70 David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care Professionals, in 
2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 68, at 423.
71 Id., at 425-426, see also 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,503-16,504.
72 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,504. 
73 David G. Adams, supra note 70, at 423; see, also, William L. Christopher, Off-label Drug Prescrip-
tion: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 THE FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247 n.6 (1993).
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Some of FDA’s own recent approaches may offer useful models for sharing of 
responsibilities. An example is FDA’s openness to the referencing of reliable, outside 
scientifi c sources to validate clinical claims for drug-metabolizing enzyme (DME) ge-
notyping systems. This type of TAB tests assesses whether a patient carries genes for 
encoding specifi c enzymes needed to metabolize certain drugs. An example would be 
a test to determine which of many CYP-450 alleles a patient carries; this information 
is useful in targeting a number of different drugs. FDA has classifi ed DME genotyp-
ing systems as Class II (moderate risk) devices that can be cleared through the 510(k) 
process.74 For these test systems, FDA requires data on basic analytical factors (e.g., 
analytical sensitivity, assay limits, interference, repeatability, and reproduceability) 
and method comparison studies showing that the test detects the genotypes it claims 
to detect.75 Clinical validity also must be substantiated; however, FDA has stated that 
it will not necessarily require prospective clinical studies, if there is an established 
scientifi c framework and a suffi cient body of evidence supporting the clinical validity 
and utility of the device.76 For enzymes where there are multiple, peer-reviewed studies 
that tested appropriate populations, these published studies can be used to substantiate 
clinical validity and utility of the test. If the literature does not adequately support the 
test’s indications for use, clinical claims would generally need to be supported with 
prospective studies.77
This approach, in effect, amounts to a sharing of responsibility for validation of these 
tests between FDA and an external authority—in this case, the scientifi c community 
by reference to peer-reviewed pharmacogenetics literature. While it certainly is not 
new for FDA to incorporate reliable, outside sources of data in its product-approval 
decisions, this overall approach may have broader application in the context of TAB 
tests. Clinicians need clear, current instructions on how to use TAB tests in targeting 
medicines, but the science of targeting is evolving so rapidly that it may be diffi cult 
for product labeling to stay current (see Section V infra). Another special problem is 
to strike an appropriate balance between product and practice regulation. Both these 
problems might be addressed by allowing FDA-approved labeling for TAB tests and 
targeted therapies to reference current TAB-testing guidelines maintained by an external 
TAB Clinical Standards Board. This Board would be formed within the medical and 
scientifi c communities to review the latest scientifi c evidence on TAB tests and maintain 
current guidelines for use of TAB testing in targeting particular medicines. Rather than 
having labeling include specifi c instructions for how to use a test to target a particular 
medicine (information that may rapidly grow out of date), FDA-approved labeling might 
simply state that the product is approved for use in accordance with current TAB-testing 
guidelines (as continuously updated by the TAB Clinical Standards Board). Reference 
to these external guidelines could reduce the need for frequent relabeling of products as 
targeting strategies improve and as clinical utility becomes better understood. Moreover, 
it would let the medical profession maintain a voice in aspects of product regulation 
that, in the case of targeted therapies, touch on medical practice.
Validation and labeling of TAB tests and targeted therapies will require innovative 
thinking and possible creation of new institutions, such as the TAB Clinical Standards 
74 21 CFR 862.3360 (Classifi cation regulation for drug metabolizing enzyme genotyping system).
75 HHS, FDA, Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Class II Special Controls Guidance Document: 
Drug Metabolizing Enzyme Genotyping System (Mar. 10, 2005), at 12. 
76 Id. at 13.
77 Id. at 14.
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Board just described. A useful fi rst step would be to convene workshops to elicit 
views of concerned constituencies, including members of the medical profession and 
scientifi c communities, state medical practice regulators, federal regulators charged 
with oversight of medical products and clinical laboratory services, patient advocacy 
groups, health insurers and payers, drug and device manufacturers, and the clinical 
laboratories industry. These workshops should seek consensus on the following is-
sues: 1) the appropriate scope and intensity of FDA’s review activities for TAB tests; 
2) where to draw the line between product and practice regulation for TAB tests; and 
3) what are the options for oversight of medical practice issues that affect the safety 
and effectiveness of TAB tests. Concerning this third issue, various approaches are 
possible, e.g., to rely on voluntary educational efforts within the medical profession; 
to involve state medical boards in regulating the clinical use of TAB tests and targeted 
therapies; or to create altogether new institutions such as a TAB Clinical Standards 
Board. Some efforts are already underway to address medical practice issues with TAB 
testing,78 but this matter is far from resolved. Statutory and regulatory amendments 
may ultimately be needed, to achieve a workable division of product and practice 
regulation for targeted therapies.
C. Phased Approval Strategies for TAB Tests and Targeted Therapies
A phased approval process may offer advantages as a way to let drugs move to mar-
ket promptly, subject to ongoing efforts to improve their targeting in the postmarket 
period. The essential feature of phased approach is that it confers some, but not all, 
of the advantages ordinarily associated with a drug approval when the drug is initially 
approved, but grants other advantages only if the manufacturer performs specifi c duties 
after the initial approval. FDA’s existing accelerated approval process for drugs that 
treat serious, life-threatening conditions bears features of a phased approach. Acceler-
ated approval can be granted, subject to special conditions of use or duties to conduct 
postmarket studies to confi rm the drug’s effectiveness.79 In recent years, there have been 
various proposals to adopt phased approval for all drugs80 and for the types of tests used 
in targeting drugs, i.e., genetic tests,81 and other in vitro diagnostic products.82
78 See, e.g., David Gurwitz, Abraham Weizman & Moshe Rehavi, Education: Teaching Pharmacogenom-
ics to Prepare Future Physicians and Researchers for Personalized Medicine, 24 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES 122 (2003); A. Woelderink, D. Ibarreta, M.M. Hopkins & E. Rodriguez-Cerezo, The Current Clinical 
Practice of Pharmacogenetic Testing in Europe: TPMT and HER2 as Case Studies, 6 THE PHARMACOGENETICS 
J. 3 (2006). 
79 21 C.F.R. § 314.510.
80 R.L. Woosley & G. Rice, A new system for moving drugs to the Market, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
OGY ONLINE (Winter 2005), at http://www.issues.org/issues/21.2/woosley.html ) (calling for phased approval 
of drugs).
81 See NIH—DOE Task Force on Genetic Testing, supra note 5, at Ch. 2 (discussing the possibility of 
granting conditional approval of genetic tests in cases where ongoing data collection is needed to confi rm 
clinical validity and utility. Such tests could be marketed, covered by insurance, and promoted subject to 
disclosure that safety and effectiveness are still under investigation).
82 B.M. Thompson, The IVAT [In vitro analytic test] Solution, IVD TECHNOLOGY (Mar., 2004) (discuss-
ing a phased approval process for in vitro diagnostic tests, allowing tests with known analytical validity to be 
marketed, subject to ongoing data collection to confi rm clinical validity and utility, and with restrictions on 
clinical claims that the manufacturer could make). See, also, G.F. Freiberg, Deregulating the clinical utility 
of IVD products, IVD TECHNOLOGY (Mar., 2006) (discussing strategies to resolve the discrepancy between 
home-brew and FDA-regulated genetic tests, including adjusting the intensity of review and phasing the 
review of analytical and clinical claims).
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A traditional, non-phased approval can be viewed as a point-in-time event, which 
confers an entire package of rights, duties, and commercial advantages on the product’s 
manufacturer. For example, once a drug is approved, it can be sold widely and its manu-
facturer can advertise and promote it for specifi ed clinical purposes. An approved drug 
can be prescribed off-label by physicians and may enjoy increased sales as a result, 
even though the manufacturer cannot promote these uses.83 Once approved, the drug 
can be prescribed without having to follow the cumbersome informed consent and 
human-subject protection requirements that apply during its investigational phase.84 
Investigational drugs may be able to obtain insurance and Medicare reimbursement, 
but reimbursement obviously becomes much easier once a drug is approved and is 
no longer seen as experimental. There are, of course, duties that come with a drug’s 
approval. FDA regulations impose various new inspection, monitoring, and reporting 
requirements85 that come into effect after a drug is approved, although some of these 
are only voluntary in nature.86 Manufacturers have only limited duties to conduct further 
studies of the safety and effectiveness of approved drugs. Traditionally, FDA lacked 
a clear statutory mandate to require postmarket study of drugs,87 although the agency 
claimed it could require such studies as part of FDA’s general powers to enforce the 
FDCA and to require drug companies to provide data bearing on whether previously 
granted approvals should be withdrawn.88 The 1992 accelerated approval program, for 
drugs that treat serious or life-threatening diseases, clearly authorized FDA to require 
postmarket studies of effectiveness (to confi rm the relation of surrogate endpoints to 
actual clinical benefi ts),89 but not of safety. Recent data suggest that completion rates, 
even for these limited postmarket study requirements, have been poor.90
A phased approach would let new drugs enter the market with some, but not all, of the 
commercial advantages just discussed, and manufacturers might face some additional 
duties. There might be initial restrictions on advertising and promotion, postmarket 
study requirements, or enhanced requirements to monitor and report adverse events. 
These special conditions would cease, if the drug later met agreed targets for safety and 
effectiveness in actual clinical use.
While a phased approach may not be appropriate for all new drugs, it could have 
real merit for drugs that appear, after Phase III clinical trials, to be poorly targeted. 
These would be drugs that offer clear therapeutic benefi ts for some patients, while 
producing high rates of non-response or serious adverse events in other patients, with 
the variability still unexplained at the time the drug is initially approved. New targeting 
strategies may continue to be discovered after such drugs are approved (See Section II, 
supra, at Scenario III), leading to fundamental improvements in their risk-benefi t ratios. 
A phased strategy would let a manufacturer’s rights and duties be adjusted as better 
targeting improves a drug’s risk-benefi t ratio over time. For example, initial approval 
could be granted, subject to a requirement to conduct postmarket pharmacogenetic 
83 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503-16,505 (June 30, 1972).
84 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 56.
85 21 C.F.R. § 314.80-81.
86 Alastair J.J. Wood, C. Michael Stein, & Raymond Woosley, Making Medicines Safer—The Need for 
an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 N. ENG. J. MED. 1851 (1998).  
87 See, e.g., FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 2005), statement of William B. Schultz, 
Partner, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_03_01/schultz.pdf.
88 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 355(k) (FDCA §§ 701(a), 505(k)); see also Geoffrey Levitt, James N. Czaban 
& Andrea Patterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 68, 
at 179.
89 21 C.F.R. § 314.510.
90 Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA?, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1063 (2005).
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studies to clarify why patients vary in their response to the drug. Specifi c objectives 
could be set to reduce the rate of adverse events and non-response within a set period 
of time, e.g., fi ve years. Poorly targeted drugs might be placed under special disclosure 
requirements, to make sure patients are aware of a drug’s low rate of therapeutic success. 
Such disclosures could be made through special labeling, through mandatory disclosure 
of non-response rates in advertising, or, in the case of serious adverse events, through 
special informed-consent requirements to be administered by the clinician at the point 
when the drug is prescribed. These disclosure requirements could be eased over time 
as the drug became better targeted, as proved by actual clinical outcomes data. Phased 
approval of poorly targeted drugs, obviously, may require changes in FDA’s existing 
statutory authority. The science of drug targeting has matured to a point where it now 
may make sense to consider these changes. Phased approval for badly targeted drugs 
would give drug manufacturers clearer incentives to conduct postmarket studies to 
improve the targeting of their products—an incentive that is very weak under current 
statutes and regulations.91
A phased process also may make sense for clearance or approval of new TAB tests. 
The clinical utility of a new test often cannot be fully evaluated until the test is in wide 
clinical use.92 This is especially true in the case of TAB tests, where clinical utility is 
measured in terms of improved clinical decisionmaking. A phased strategy would let 
new TAB tests enter the market subject to restrictions. For example, new TAB tests might 
be granted initial clearance based on proof of their analytical validity, with postmarket 
study requirements to substantiate their clinical validity and utility for use in targeting 
particular drugs. After this fi rst approval, the TAB test could be marketed for clinical use, 
subject to informed consent or disclosure requirements, so that patients would know that 
the test’s clinical validity and utility are not yet fully established. Efforts could be made 
to promote insurance coverage for TAB tests following their initial clearance. This could 
be similar in concept to the proposed Medicare coverage-with-evidence-development 
policy, which would allow experimental therapies to receive Medicare reimbursement 
subject to ongoing data-collection requirements. TAB tests could be required to obtain 
a second, fi nal regulatory clearance at a later date, after their clinical claims have been 
further substantiated. To create an incentive to complete the postmarket studies, TAB 
tests could be required to gain this second clearance in a fi xed period of time (e.g., fi ve 
years) or else be withdrawn.
In the era of pharmacogenomics, drug approval decisions involve explicit interper-
sonal trade-offs among subgroups of patients who benefi t, fail to respond, or are harmed 
by a particular drug. Phased approval offers opportunities to balance the interests of 
these respective groups by letting promising new therapies reach benefi ting patients 
promptly, while requiring ongoing efforts to protect the adverse- and non-responders. 
Phased strategies appear particularly appropriate for 1) new TAB tests, in cases where 
clinical utility remains uncertain, and 2) new drugs that are poorly targeted at the time 
of their initial approval (i.e., drugs for which premarket clinical trial data show sub-
stantial rates of unexplained patient non-response or adverse response). Policymakers 
should evaluate the merits of various phased approval approaches and consider specifi c 
amendments to the FDCA, FDA regulations, CLIA, Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement 
policies, and state insurance regulations to support phased approval of poorly targeted 
drugs and the tests that are needed to target these drugs more precisely.
91 See, generally, Evans et al., supra note 3.
92 National Academy of Sciences, supra note 54. 
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V. LABELING OF TARGETED THERAPIES AND THE CHALLENGE OF KEEPING 
CLINICIANS INFORMED 
A. Limits of Product Labeling as an Informational Medium
Patients cannot benefi t from advances in pharmacogenomics unless clinicians have 
good, up-to-date, practice-oriented information about which tests to use to target par-
ticular drugs, and how to translate test results into specifi c prescribing decisions. The 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS), in its 
priority-setting discussions, has focused on physicians’ need for practical advice on 
the use of pharmacogenomic data in clinical settings.93 There already are cases where 
drugs have been relabeled to incorporate pharmacogenomic information,94 although 
submission of pharmacogenomic data to FDA remains largely voluntary, with manda-
tory submission required only in certain instances.95 Scientists and physicians have 
called for more information about genetic variability of drug response to be included 
in drug labeling.96
Before making detailed decisions about when, how, and how much pharmacogenomic 
information should be placed in product labeling, there is a need to ask whether labeling 
is a good medium for communicating this information. Product labeling traditionally 
has been FDA’s fi rst-line medium for communicating indicated uses, instructions, and 
warnings to clinicians. Approval and labeling of targeted therapies have been, and 
continue to be, clarifi ed through efforts by FDA’s Offi ce of In Vitro Diagnostic Devices 
(OIVD), Offi ce of Combination Products (OCP), and Interdisciplinary Pharmacogenom-
ics Review Group (IPRG). Despite these efforts, there may be real limits, discussed 
infra, on how informative FDA-approved product labeling is likely to be in the case of 
TAB tests and targeted therapies. An entirely new mechanism may be needed to ensure 
timely communication of information about targeted therapies to clinicians.
Wide variations in labeling already are apparent in the handful of TAB tests and 
targeted drugs that FDA has approved to date. There are a few examples where a drug 
and a TAB test are expressly cross-labeled for use together, so that the drug labeling 
identifi es specifi c tests and gives information on how to vary prescribing in response to 
test results97 (see Section V.D, infra, for more on cross-labeling). In other cases, labeling 
merely notes that patient response may vary based on genetic factors, but lacks specifi c 
recommendations for testing and interpretation of test results.98 Some drugs that are 
93 E. Winn-Deen, Session Overview and Goals, SACGHS MEETING TRANSCRIPT (June 15-16, 2005), at 
www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/meetings/June2005/transcript/6-16_Session_Overview.pdf.
94 Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 3, at 767-768.
95 HHS, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Pharmacogenomic Data Submissions (Mar., 2005), at 10-11, 
19–24.
96 See, e.g., Tommy Andersson, David A. Flockhart, David B. Goldstein, et al., Drug-metabolizing 
Enzymes: Evidence for Clinical Utility of Pharmacogenomic Tests, 78 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 
559, 560 (2005).
97 See, e.g., approved package insert for trastuzumab (HerceptinTM), at http://www.gene.com/gene/prod-
ucts/information/oncology/herceptin/insert.jsp; see sections entitled CLINICAL STUDIES: HER2 Detection 
and PRECAUTIONS: HER2 Testing, which cross-reference package inserts for the HercepTestTM IHC assay 
and the PathvysionTM HER-2 DNA Probe Kit (FISH test) products. 
98 See, e.g., approved package insert for Atomoxetine HCl (StratteraTM); see sections entitled Human 
Pharmacokinetics: Metabolism and Elimination, Drug-Drug Interactions, and PRECAUTIONS: Drug-
Drug Interactions, noting that the drug is metabolized primarily through the CYP2D6 enzymatic pathway 
and commenting on the possible need for dosage adjustment when the drug is co-administered with certain 
CYP2D6 inhibitors. See, also, Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 3, at 766 for a discussion of factors that were 
considered in deciding how to address gene-drug interactions in Atomoxetine labeling. 
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known to exhibit genetic variability of response do not yet mention this fact in labeling. 
Some TAB tests have been approved for use in identifying particular biomarkers that 
have been shown, in peer-reviewed literature, to affect drug response; it is left up to the 
clinician to decide how to use that test to target a particular drug.99 Moreover, clinicians 
are faced with making decisions about the use of home-brew TAB tests for which no 
FDA-approved labeling exists.
In theory, clearer information could be provided to clinicians if FDA reviewed all 
TAB tests (including home-brew tests) and required specifi c cross-labeling of TAB tests 
and the drugs they target. In practice, this is unlikely to be a workable solution. It is not 
clear that FDA has the legal authority to compel drug and test manufacturers to cross-
label their products, unless they voluntarily agree to cooperate (see Section V.D, infra). 
Even if FDA had this authority, cross-labeling may not be a good idea for other reasons. 
FDA’s processes for validating and amending claims in drug labeling may be too slow, 
too deliberate, and too costly to keep pace with advances in this rapidly evolving fi eld. 
Some advances in personalized medicine will be in the nature of discrete, substantial 
technological advances that, once made, remain standing for a signifi cant period of time. 
It may be feasible to refl ect such discoveries in drug labeling. However, many impor-
tant advances will occur as a rapid sequence of infi nitesimal, successive improvements 
(e.g., a more sensitive test that allows lethal reactions to a drug to be shaved by one 
or two per cent). TAB tests, like other diagnostic products, go through rapid technical 
evolution, often on a 12–18 month cycle, and small improvements can have life-and-
death consequences for patients who would have been erroneously identifi ed under an 
older TAB test. Cementing test recommendations into FDA-approved product labeling 
could delay the clinical uptake of new, better tests. Finally, the issue of off-label use is 
especially complex in the case of targeted therapies, since either the TAB test, the drug 
itself, or both potentially can be used off-label (see Section V.C, infra). Even if labeling 
provides specifi c instructions on how to target a drug in its indicated use, this scarcely 
addresses the full array of off-label uses that clinicians may confront.
If product labeling is not a good medium for providing clear, current information to 
clinicians, then alternative approaches may be needed. Surveys and interviews should be 
conducted to assess diffi culties clinicians are experiencing in interpreting and applying 
information in the various labeling scenarios that already exist for targeted therapies. 
These labeling scenarios include: a) specifi c cross-labeling of drugs and FDA-reviewed 
TAB tests; b) drug labeling that provides non-specifi c warnings and/or information about 
genetic variability of patient response; and (c) drugs for which labeling does not address 
variability of treatment response, but for which there is other scientifi c evidence sug-
gesting variability of drug response in response to particular biomarkers. These last two 
scenarios can be further nuanced, depending on: 1) whether FDA-cleared or approved 
tests are available to measure the particular biomarker that correlates with variations in 
drug response; 2) whether only home-brew tests are available; or 3) whether both types 
of test are available. For these various scenarios, key questions are: What resources 
are physicians currently using to draw sound clinical conclusions from this disparate 
information? What additional resources do clinicians feel they need (e.g., up-to-date 
99 See, e.g., FDA, New Device Clearance: Roche Amplichip CYP450 Genotyping test, supra note 16. 
See, generally, HHS, FDA, Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Class II Special Controls Guidance Docu-
ment: Drug Metabolizing Enzyme Genotyping System (Mar. 10, 2005), § 8, at 13-14 (providing for approval 
based on peer-reviewed scientifi c literature and other external evidence of validity and utility under certain 
circumstances).  See, also, HHS, FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Pharmacogenetic Tests 
and Genetic Tests for Heritable Markers (Feb. 9, 2006), § F, at 13 (describing conditions under which FDA 
may clear a new test for clinical use based on the existence of suffi cient published literature establishing 
clinical performance).
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information about the validity of particular biomarkers as tools for directing the use 
of particular drugs; current standards concerning the clinical claims that physicians 
reasonably can make about TAB tests and their usefulness in directing drug therapy; 
information about available TAB tests and which ones are relevant to the targeting of 
which drug)?
Following this assessment of clinicians’ needs, the next step is to identify how best 
to provide the information they currently lack. Options include, for example, a set of 
voluntary practice guidelines and standards issued by a special-purpose TAB Clinical 
Standards Board formed within the medical profession and scientifi c community; ex-
pansion of formal regulatory activities by FDA and state medical boards; or enhanced 
legal duties for drug manufacturers to maintain current information about the targeting 
of their drugs. These last two options likely would require amendments to existing 
statutes and regulations, which would take time. On the other hand, standards set by 
a TAB Clinical Standards Board initially could be framed as voluntary medical prac-
tice guidelines and would not require statutory authorization. Implementation may be 
swifter, but the guidelines would lack binding legal or regulatory effect. Over time, as 
its standards become well established, the Clinical Standards Board could work with 
state and federal legislatures and regulatory bodies to have its standards formally recog-
nized for various legal and regulatory purposes (e.g., for use in Medicare and insurance 
reimbursement decisions, to inform the standard of care in drug-injury lawsuits, and to 
determine state-law informed consent requirements in situations where administering 
a drug would pose special risks for a particular population subgroup). A good example 
of voluntary standards that have subsequently been adopted for regulatory use are the 
Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) billing codes, which were developed by the 
American Medical Association (AMA) in the 1960s and 1970s as a recommended mea-
sure to improve the consistency of medical records, but later adopted as a requirement for 
Medicare and Medicaid billing in the 1980s.100 Each approach obviously has advantages 
and disadvantages and different implications that need to be carefully weighed.
B. Impact of Labeling Policy on Reimbursement, Patient Access, and 
Standard of Care
How targeted therapies are labeled may have important impacts on patients’ rights 
and patients’ access to needed care. These impacts need to be better understood, to 
ensure consistent legal treatment of functionally similar therapeutic products. Different 
targeted therapies may be labeled in different ways—some with specifi c cross-labeling 
of the drug and TAB test, some without, and some with only general information about 
genetic variability of drug response—and these differences may carry important legal 
and social implications.
For example, many states recognize labeling as a factor to consider in determining 
the standard of care.101 Whether products are cross-labeled could affect physicians’ duty 
to run a TAB test before administering a drug. It also may affect preemption in state tort 
lawsuits. A TAB test that is part of a cross-labeled combination product may have been 
approved as part of the new drug application, as opposed to being separately cleared or 
approved under FDA’s device regulations. FDA drug and device approvals may have 
100 AMA, CPT Process—How a Code Becomes a Code, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
print/3882.html.
101 Linda A. Sharp, Annotation: Malpractice: Physician’s Liability for Injury or Death Resulting from 
Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally Administered to or Prescribed for a Patient, 57 A.L.R. 5th 433, § 2[a] 
(1997, updated through 2004). 
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different preemptive effects under state tort law.  Under the learned intermediary doc-
trine, the content of labeling also may affect the apportionment of liability as between 
product manufacturers and physicians.102
Medicare and insurance coverage and reimbursement decisions may refer to approved 
indications in labeling, when establishing whether a given treatment is reimbursable. 
Problems with reimbursement of testing services and TAB tests pose an important 
potential barrier to wider clinical use of targeted therapies.103  SACGHS has identifi ed 
coverage and reimbursement of genetic technologies and services as one of the high-
est priority issues for analysis and deliberation.104 Whether a TAB test is “reasonable 
and necessary” for purposes of insurance coverage and reimbursement may depend 
on factors such as 1) whether the drug and TAB test were approved as a combination 
product (see Section V.D, infra), which implies that they would be cross-labeled for 
use together, 2) whether they are otherwise cross-labeled, or 3) whether they are ap-
proved separately and labeled for separate use. Patients’ access to targeted therapies 
could thus depend on the vagaries of whether a drug and TAB test happen to be cross-
labeled. Impacts on access may need to be addressed by clarifying Medicare/Medicaid 
and insurance regulations.
TAB tests include many different types of tests, e.g., tests to detect a particular protein 
in a patient’s tumor, vs. genetic tests that predict the patients’ ability to metabolize a 
particular drug. These differences also may have broader legal signifi cance. For example, 
a test that establishes whether a patient’s disease has particular molecular targets (e.g., 
HER-2 for trastuzmab) may fall within legal concept of “diagnosis,” since HER-2 posi-
tive and HER-2 negative breast cancer are, in effect, two different illnesses. In contrast, 
a test that predicts a patient’s metabolic response to medicine does not fall so clearly 
under the notion of “diagnosis.” This difference could affect whether a physician has 
a legal duty under state law to order the test (e.g., whether tort case law pertaining to 
misdiagnosis is applicable), and it also may affect the willingness of insurers to cover 
the test. It may be necessary to update existing laws and regulations to clarify their 
application to TAB tests and targeted therapies, to avoid irrational distinctions in how 
functionally similar therapies are treated under the law.
C. Ethical, Legal, and Safety Issues with Off-label Use of Targeted 
Therapies and TAB Tests
Off-label use of medical products has long held a valid place in medical practice. It 
is neither feasible nor cost-effective to perform clinical trials to test every conceivable 
use of a new medical product. After a product has been approved by FDA, physicians 
are allowed to prescribe it to treat patient subgroups and health conditions, other than 
those for which the product has been tested, even if this means disregarding safety 
warnings in the product labeling.105 Off-label use supports discovery of new therapeutic 
uses that otherwise would have gone undiscovered. Without off-label uses, population 
subgroups that are hard to include in clinical trials (e.g., children, the elderly, pregnant 
102 Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation: Construction and Application of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1998, updated through 2004). 
103 Institute of Medicine, MEDICARE LABORATORY PAYMENT POLICY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE (Dianne Miller 
Wolman, Andrea L. Kalfoglou, and Lauren LeRoy, eds., (2000)), at 1-3.  See, also, The Lewin Group, THE 
VALUE OF DIAGNOSTICS: INNOVATION, ADOPTION, AND DIFFUSION INTO HEALTH CARE (July, 2005), at 5, 92-130.
104 SACGHS, DRAFT REPORT ON COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES 
(Jun. 14, 2004), at http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/meetings/June2004/Berry.pdf.
105 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 7, at 48-50 (reviewing regulations and literature on off-label use).
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women) might be left with few treatment options. The challenge, in setting policy, is to 
strike an appropriate balance between allowing off-label uses and promoting physician 
compliance with important instructions for use and safety warnings.
Off-label use presents especially complex issues in the case of targeted therapies. With 
a traditional, untargeted drug, the lack of an approved indication for use in a particular 
population subgroup may simply mean that the drug was never tested in that subgroup. 
This does not necessarily imply that the drug would be positively unsafe or ineffective 
if physicians prescribed it off-label for members of that subgroup. In contrast, clinical 
trials for targeted therapies may have excluded certain subpopulations deliberately, 
based on genetic or other data suggesting that the drug would be ineffective or unsafe 
in that subgroup. For genetically targeted therapies, the lack of an approved indication 
in labeling may be “with prejudice,” i.e., it may mean, “this use may be bad,” rather 
than merely “this use was never tested.” Another complicating factor is that targeted 
therapies involve the use of two products: a TAB test and a drug. “Off-label use” could 
mean many different things, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Examples of Off-label Uses of Targeted Therapies and TAB Tests
Off-label Use Scenario Description
Off-label use of a TAB test.
On-label use of the drug. 
Use of a novel targeting strategy, based on 
unsubstantiated beliefs about the effect of par-
ticular genes or biomarkers on drug response. 
However, the drug is being used to treat a health 
condition for which the drug has been shown 
to be effective.
Off-label use of a drug relative to 
health conditions listed in its ap-
proved indications.
On-label use of the TAB test.
Use of a drug to treat a health condition for 
which the drug has not been approved. How-
ever, a known targeting strategy is being used 
(e.g., the drug is known to be metabolized by 
the CYP-450 enzyme and is approved for use 
for one illness; now the drug is being used to 
treat a different illness but patients will still be 
screened to determine their CYP-450 enzyme 
status). 
Off-label use of a drug relative to 
population subgroups for which its 
use is approved (i.e., use contrary to 
recommended targeting strategy).
Use of a targeted therapy in a population 
subgroup other than the one for which it is 
intended. (e.g., giving a drug that is intended 
for use in HER-2 positive patients to HER-2 
negative patients; giving a drug to a patient who 
lacks enzymes for metabolizing it).
Off-label use of both the drug and 
the TAB test
Use of a targeting strategy that is not substanti-
ated, to direct the use of a drug to treat a condi-
tion for which it is not approved.
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These various scenarios carry different medical, legal, and ethical implications, 
and they may differ in terms of whether there are avenues available for FDA or state 
regulators to control, or at least discourage, the particular off-label use in question. It 
seems a safe assumption that off-label uses of both TAB tests and the drugs they target 
may become widespread. These uses present medical practice issues, liability issues, 
informed consent issues, and insurance reimbursement issues that need further study. 
There may be a public health need to restrict some off-label uses of targeted therapies 
and TAB tests, but this may present diffi cult implementation issues. Expanding FDA’s 
authority to regulate off-label uses could raise concerns about the appropriate division 
of state and federal authority to regulate the practice of medicine. Alternatives would 
be to address off-label use of targeted therapies through the medical practice regula-
tions of the fi fty states, or through some alternative standard-setting institution yet to 
be created.
Policy decisions about off-label use of TAB tests and targeted therapies need to be 
informed by good data and analysis. The fi rst step would be to characterize the vari-
ous scenarios of off-label use of these products and to develop examples to aid in the 
analysis. For each scenario, what are the public health, ethical, legal, and economic 
implications? In particular, are there different implications for TAB tests that detect 
safety biomarkers, as opposed to biomarkers that bear on a drug’s effectiveness? The 
second step would be to assess the pros and cons of imposing restrictions on off-label 
use in the special context of targeted therapies and TAB testing. Certain off-label use 
scenarios may be particularly wasteful (e.g., giving a drug that is known to work only 
on certain types of tumors to a patient who does not have that type of tumor, simply 
because the patient is out of treatment options and has asked to try the drug) or danger-
ous (e.g., ignoring a known valid safety biomarker that indicates the patient is at high 
risk for a serious adverse effect). Different measures may be appropriate for managing 
off-label uses that appear to be particularly wasteful or dangerous (e.g., allowing use 
with informed consent vs. banning the use altogether). Finally, there is a need to assess 
which regulators are best positioned to address each of these problems, and what ad-
ditional statutory or regulatory authority they may need.
Many parties would benefi t from a clarifi cation of the ethical, legal, and safety issues 
that surround off-label use of targeted therapies. Regulators, product manufacturers, and 
physicians need this information to guide basic decisions about appropriate off-label uses 
of these new products. Attorneys and courts will need this information as they begin to 
encounter drug-injury suits related to the off-label use of targeted therapies and TAB tests. 
This information also is needed as a basis for efforts to educate the public about new or 
unfamiliar risks that may arise when targeted therapies are prescribed off-label.
D. Policy Issues with Cross-Labeling of Drugs and TAB Tests
Cross-labeling refers to the notion of having drug labeling cross-reference TAB tests, 
and vice-versa. As noted in Section V.A, supra, this would allow product labeling to 
provide clear indications for use of the drug in patient subgroups with different genes 
or biomarkers, along with instructions on how to use TAB tests to measure the relevant 
patient traits for targeting the particular drug. Cross-labeling could offer public health 
advantages and could facilitate introduction of new targeted therapies. However, the 
issue of cross-labeling has been controversial and there are merits on either side of the 
debate. Regulatory policies on this matter have ethical, legal, public-health and com-
mercial impacts that need to be carefully examined.
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FDA does not appear to have clear authority, under current statutes and regulations, 
to compel a drug manufacturer to cross-label its product for use with a TAB test made 
by another manufacturer.106 FDA has indicated that it will pursue policies to encourage 
voluntary cooperation among manufacturers,107 but apparently will stop short of forc-
ing companies to cooperate against their will. Segments of the industry have voiced 
strong opposition to compulsory cross-labeling, citing various legal, commercial, and 
product-quality concerns.108 Cross-labeling of products could subject one manufacturer 
to liability for defects in the other manufacturer’s product. It could delay approval of 
modifi cations, when products undergo modernization and improvement. For business 
reasons, a manufacturer may not wish to be placed into a “forced marriage” with the 
manufacturer of a cross-labeled product. FDA’s fees for amending labeling are sub-
stantial,109 and the revisions necessary to effect cross-labeling take time and effort to 
complete. Unless manufacturers voluntarily agree to cooperate, there is presently no 
good mechanism to achieve cross-labeling.
Even in situations where a drug and a TAB test both are made by a single manufac-
turer, the question of mandatory cross-labeling has been controversial. The question of 
cross-labeling is tied up with the issue of whether therapies that combine a drug and a 
TAB test should be regulated as combination products (see Box 2 below). FDA’s Offi ce 
of Combination Products, in 2005, published a concept paper110 suggesting that FDA 
should be able to require such manufacturers to fi le a single combination-product111 
application in certain circumstances, rather than fi le separate drug and device applica-
tions for approval. Industry comments were strongly opposed to this and cited sound 
legal and commercial reasons why manufacturers might wish, in a given instance, to 
avoid cross-labeling of a drug and device as a combination product.112 Similar objections 
were voiced in response to FDA’s drug/device co-development draft concept paper,113 
and FDA amended its language to make clear that co-developed drugs and TAB tests 
will not necessarily be treated as combination products.
A practical problem with cross-labeling is that the majority of TAB tests may continue 
to be non-FDA-regulated home-brew tests, which would be unsuitable for cross-labeling, 
since their analytical and clinical claims have not met the standard of proof required 
for inclusion in labeling. Yet, if drugs are cross-labeled only with FDA-approved TAB 
tests, this could have the effect of referencing an outdated, FDA-approved test that 
home-brew makers have subsequently improved.
To date, the cross-labeling issue has been debated primarily within the medical prod-
ucts industry. There needs to be a wider, more inclusive discussion of public-health as 
well as business impacts of cross-labeling policy. Fair consideration should be given to 
106 FDA/DIA WORKSHOP: COMBINATION PRODUCTS AND MUTUALLY CONFORMING LABELING (May 10, 2005), 
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/presentations/dia/dia05_10.html. See, Presentation of Nancy Stade, 
Offi ce of the Chief Counsel, FDA, Legal Considerations in Cross Labeling Policy; Presentation of Suzanne 
O’Shea, Offi ce of Combination Products, FDA, Perspectives on Cross Labeling. 
107 Id. 
108 FDA/DIA WORKSHOP, supra note 106, see, e.g., Presentation of Anna Longwell, Roche Diagnostics, 
FDA’s Role in Encouraging Innovation in Combination Products; Presentation of David Eveleth, Pfi zer, Inc., 
Combination Products and Mutually Conforming Labeling.
109 HHS, FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2007, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,780, 42,784 
(Aug. 2, 2006); Medical Device User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2007, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,784, 43,785 (Aug. 2, 
2006).
110 HHS, FDA, Request for Comments on Concept Paper: Number of Marketing Applications for 
Combination Products (Sept., 2005), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/reqcomm905.html. 
111 As defi ned in 21 CFR 3.2(e). 
112 See, e.g., Combination Products Coalition, Comments on Concept Paper: Number of Marketing 
Applications for a Combination Product (Docket No. 2005N-0098) (Nov. 15, 2005), at: www.combination-
products.com/images/Comments_FDA_111505.pdf.
113 HHS, FDA, Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper (Apr., 2005), supra note 13.
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the “pros” of providing FDA greater authority to require cross-labeling of drugs and TAB 
tests in specifi c situations where the case for mandatory cross-labeling is strongest (e.g., 
situations where failure to cross-label products poses serious patient-safety issues). The 
“cons” also demand careful consideration (e.g., lags in updating labeling to refl ect new 
technologies; problems in apportioning liability among manufacturers; the possibility of 
constitutional “takings” problems if manufacturers are forced into unwanted business 
relationships). If mandatory cross-labeling is not a workable policy option, then the 
debate returns to the question of what alternative measures may be needed, to provide 
clear instructions and warnings to clinicians (See Section V.A supra).
Box 2. Targeted Therapies May or May Not be Combination Products
FDA’s regulations at 21 CFR 3.2(e) defi ne combination products, which are prod-
ucts that combine a medical device (such as a genetic test), a drug, and/or a biologic. 
A targeted therapy, which uses a genetic test to inform the prescribing of a drug, 
may or may not fi t within FDA’s defi nition of a “combination product.” Whether it 
does has important implications for the labeling of the targeted therapy—i.e., what 
labeling information will be available to help physicians understand how to use the 
targeted therapy. It also affects the approval pathway and other regulatory require-
ments that will apply to the targeted therapy.
Even though the drug and the test are packaged separately, they may still qualify 
as a combination product, but only if certain conditions are met: The labeling of 
one of the products must indicate that it is intended for use only with an “approved 
individually specifi ed” second product, where both are required to achieve the in-
tended use, indication, or effect.114 Moreover, if the two products are FDA-approved 
at different times, the second approval would necessitate a change in the labeling 
of the fi rst product.115
Thus, if a drug’s labeling specifi cally indicates that the drug is for use with an 
FDA-approved test, which is individually specifi ed, the pair would be a combination 
product. The meaning of “individually specifi ed” has not yet been clarifi ed but is 
thought to require reference to a specifi c test by its proprietary name.
 Examples of Targeted Therapies That are Not Combination Products
•      A drug’s indicated use is in patients with a certain genotype or biomarker, but 
the drug’s labeling does not name a specifi c test to use
•      A drug’s indicated use is in patients with a certain genotype or biomarker, but 
the needed test is not FDA-approved and is a CLIA-regulated home-brew test
•    Drug labeling merely notes that genetic variation in drug response has been 
observed.
VI. COOPERATIVE DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TARGETED THERAPIES
A. Reducing Barriers to Cooperative Discovery and Development
In pharmacogenomics, the linear product-development pipeline often is supplanted 
by a “spider web” in, which new products emerge from interlinked contributions of 
114 21 CFR 3.2(e)(3).
115 Id.
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many different parties, as depicted in Figure 5. Developing a single targeted therapy 
may require inputs from diverse sources: a drug or biologic product; a genetic test for 
screening patients’ probable response to that product; clinical laboratory services; tis-
sue resources, genetic and clinical information, research tools, and algorithms for use 
in discovering and validating the targeting strategy. Essential inputs often are held by 
separate commercial and non-commercial entities and may be subject to patent, copy-
right, trade-secret, and/or contractual protections. Discovering targeted therapies and 
translating them into clinical use requires that inputs fl ow together in new ways, i.e., 
that separate entities cooperate.
Since the early phases of the Human Genome Project, there has been concern that 
intellectual property rights have the potential to impede cooperation that is needed to 
develop clinically useful therapies.116 The NIH has provided substantial funding under 
its Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues program to examine impacts of gene patents and 
other IP protections that restrict access to data and research tools. NIH also has provided 
leadership through its guidelines for technology licensing, data sharing, and research 
material exchanges. These measures have helped allay concerns that IP rights may block 
clinical translation in pharmacogenomics.
An equally disturbing prospect is that non-cooperating parties may be able to engage 
in a wide variety of other strategic blocking behaviors based not on IP rights, but on 
powers and rights the parties may have under other laws and regulations. The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)117 privacy regulations118 
and regulations for protection of human research subjects119 have an important, intended 
purpose—to protect people who have donated their tissues and health information for 
116 See, e.g., National Research Council, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza, 
eds., (2006)).  See, generally, M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, Can patents deter innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). See, also, L.B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: 
Balancing Commercial Incentives With Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65 (2002).
117 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codifi ed in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
118 45 C.F.R. Parts 160, 164.
119 45 C.F.R. Part 46; 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 56. 
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medical research. They should not be allowed to become mere pretexts by which manu-
facturers can block fl ows of data and tissues that might allow third parties to improve the 
targeting of existing drugs. Finding ways to protect trial participants and tissue donors, 
while still promoting information fl ows that are critical to the development of targeted 
therapies, will be a crucial challenge in coming years.
Other “regulatory-blocking” behaviors could include, for example, taking advan-
tage of features of existing FDA regulations to delay a third party in moving new or 
better targeting strategies to patients. FDA regulations rely heavily on the concept of 
a unitary product sponsor (either an individual company or a cooperating group of 
companies). The FDCA and FDA regulations grant the sponsor signifi cant discretion 
to make elective choices that affect how a given medical product will be regulated in 
the future. For example, the sponsor of a targeted therapy, consisting of a drug to be 
used together with a genetic test, may choose to seek approval of the drug and test as 
a cross-labeled combination product,120 in which case the pair seemingly would have 
a “drug” primary mode of action and be regulated, together, as a drug.121 However, the 
sponsor may elect to pursue a separate device clearance or approval for the test, in ad-
dition to seeking the required drug approval for the drug/device combination product.122 
A third alternative is to seek separate device and drug approvals for non-cross-labeled 
use. These choices may affect the ease with which a third party later can seek a 510(k) 
clearance123 for a similar test (using the original test as the predicate device), as opposed 
to having to seek a premarket approval for the new test (if no other predicate device 
exists).124 The ability to use a 510(k) clearance, rather than a premarket approval, can 
mean a signifi cant reduction in the cost, time, and data requirements for moving the 
newer test to market. Elective choices by individual manufacturers affect the barriers 
to entry faced by other product developers. Such choices, in most cases, are driven by 
individual business concerns and are not driven by any nefarious intent to erect entry 
barriers to exclude competitors; however, this latter potential does exist and needs to 
be better understood.
Targeted therapies, in many cases, will fl ow from complex, multi-party interactions 
that existing regulations did not envision. Unless the necessary parties can be induced 
to cooperate, benefi cial therapeutic concepts may lack clear pathways for FDA approval 
and postmarket regulation. Even when parties desire to cooperate in their dealings with 
FDA, they may face other barriers to cooperation, for example, under antitrust law or 
under the HIPAA privacy regulations. Discoveries by third parties (i.e., parties other 
than the drug manufacturer) may be essential to better targeting of therapies, since there 
may be little economic incentive for the drug manufacturer to explore new targeting 
strategies that would reduce drug sales by screening out non-responding patients.125 
Adverse responders (people who are injured by a drug) confront manufacturers with a 
risk of lawsuits, but non-responders (who do not benefi t, but are not directly injured) 
pose little threat of litigation under current tort doctrines.126 Non-responders are a source 
of sales revenue with little litigation risk; what incentive is there to invest in research 
to screen them out? Third parties, including academic researchers and independent test 
120 21 C.F.R. § 3.2.
121 HHS, FDA, Defi nition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product: Final Rule [Docket 
No. 2004N-0194], 70 Fed. Reg. 49,848-49,862 (Aug. 25, 2005); see defi nitions at 21 C.F.R. 3.2(k),(m). 
122 FDA, Offi ce of Combination Products, Concept Paper: Number of Marketing Applications for a 
Combination Product, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combinations/singlesepconpaper.html, see section entitled, 
When might FDA accept two marketing applications when a single application would be suffi cient? 
123 21 C.F.R. Part 807, Subpt. E, §§ 807.81 – 807.100.
124 21 C.F.R. Part 814.
125 Evans et al., supra note 3, at 1289.
126 Id.
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developers, may ultimately be the most prolifi c source of new discoveries of how to 
target existing drugs (See Section II, supra, at Scenario III). Without cooperation of the 
drug developer, it may not be possible for these independent test developers to cross-
label their tests for use with specifi c drugs (See Section V.D, supra). In some cases, it 
may not be possible to bring the tests to market at all (cross-labeled or not), without 
access to proprietary data held by the drug manufacturer.
There are occasional allegations of blocking behaviors, many of them arising when 
a small test developer is rebuffed in an attempt to interest a large drug manufacturer in 
a product-development co-venture.127 The frequency of these problems has not been 
systematically examined, nor are the reasons well enough understood to assess whether 
anything improper is occurring. A rebuff could, for example, refl ect honest differences 
in business judgment about the attractiveness of the co-venture or valid concerns about 
apportionment of product liability; it does not necessarily imply a more sinister mo-
tive to preserve market share at the expense of non-responding patients. Policymakers 
and participants in the medical products industry need basic, empirical information: 
Are there grounds to suspect that improper blocking behaviors actually are occurring? 
If so, which specifi c provisions of current laws and regulations lend themselves to 
blocking behaviors in multiparty discovery and development scenarios? Can laws and 
regulations be modernized in a way that reduces this potential? If the alleged blocking 
behaviors refl ect legitimate concerns about apportionment of liabilities for drugs and 
tests that are used together, then how can liability issues be resolved for cooperatively 
developed therapies?
The “big picture” here is this: Pharmacogenomics requires a diffi cult balancing of 
public and private interests—the public’s interest in reducing drug-related injuries 
through improved targeting vs. the interest of drug developers in controlling the destiny 
of their own proprietary know-how and products. The drug, biologics, and medical 
device industries in the United States have long operated under a competitive business 
structure, and it is inevitably controversial to suggest that these industries may exhibit 
utility-like characteristics. Without questioning the competitive model for the industry 
as a whole, it is fair to ask whether this traditional business model is optimal for the 
particular subset of industry activities that relate to pharmacogenomics. Discovery and 
validation of biomarkers that affect drug response, viewed as a business pursuit, exhibit 
strong “natural monopoly” characteristics, not unlike those seen in public utility indus-
tries like electric power transmission. In particular, duplicative investments to discover 
and validate the same biomarker add little social value and there are economies of scale 
to a large, networked discovery effort in which information and data are widely shared. 
Standardization may offer real benefi ts (e.g., there would be less confusion in applying 
TAB tests if physicians had one rather than multiple tests for a given biomarker). On 
the other hand, standardization is often the enemy of innovation and improvement. The 
optimal structure for pharmacogenomic activities—cooperative vs. competitive—can 
be argued either way. At present, this debate has scarcely begun.
The recent formation of an industry group to cooperate in the validation of drug safety 
biomarkers128 is an example of a voluntary effort by companies to work together. The 
United States may decide, for many good reasons, not to pursue policies that would 
make intra-industry cooperation mandatory. However, short of that, there may be ad-
vantages in simply reducing the barriers to voluntary cooperation. The fi rst step would 
127 U.K. Pharmacogenetics Study Group, POLICY ISSUES IN PHARMACOGENETICS: A POLICY BRIEFING FROM 
THE U.K. PHARMACOGENETICS STUDY GROUP (July, 2006) 4,5, at http://www.york.ac.uk/res/pgx/publications.
128 FDA, FDA and the Critical Path Institute Announce Predictive Safety Testing Consortium (News 
release P06-40, (Mar. 16, 2006)).
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be to identify the potential barriers (e.g., antitrust concerns; HIPAA constraints on 
sharing of data; aspects of human-subject protection regulations such as requirements 
for specifi city of consent to future uses of stored tissues; disparities between FDA and 
Common Rule human-subject protections and other harmonization problems that make 
it hard for separate entities to mesh their respective research programs).129
A related issue is the appropriate ownership structures for discoveries made through 
cooperative efforts in pharmacogenetics and molecular targeting of therapies. These 
discoveries carry signifi cant implications for public health, since badly targeted therapies 
can harm patients; this would weigh in favor of public ownership as a shared resource. 
However, signifi cant private investments are required to make these discoveries, and 
investment may dry up if legitimate private interests are not protected. A major question 
in coming years will be, “What is the appropriate balance of public and private interests 
in pharmacogenomics and what are the various policy options through which it can be 
achieved?” Pharmacogenomics is a paradigm-shifting technological change that may 
require a rethinking of old business structures and regulatory assumptions.
B. Redefi ning the “Finished” Medical Product in the Age of 
Pharmacogenomics
In principle, the risk-benefi t characteristics of any drug can be improved through 
subsequent discovery of molecular or pharmacogenetic targeting strategies. The most 
obvious candidates are drugs that have a narrow therapeutic range, wide inter-individual 
variability in dosing requirements, and frequent and serious safety problems.130 To reap 
the full clinical benefi ts of pharmacogenomics, the United States needs to foster and 
stimulate this form of “successive improvement” activity. Current law and regulations 
were not designed with this as a goal.
Postmarket pharmacogenomic discovery (See Section II, supra, at Scenario III ) alters 
the very concept of a fi nished medical product, which is implicit in FDA’s current regula-
tory approval paradigm. Current regulations view approved drugs as fi nished products, 
rather than as intermediate raw materials to which additional value is yet to be added. 
FDA approves a drug based on a particular risk-benefi t ratio, often evaluated in clinical 
trials in an unscreened population of trial participants. FDA has little authority to require 
postmarket studies aimed at improving this risk-benefi t ratio, and current regulations 
lack an effective cost-spreading mechanism to aid product sponsors in recovering the 
costs of such studies from all the parties who stand to gain from improved targeting.131 
As a result, current regulations do little to promote successive improvement of the risk-
benefi t ratio by drug manufacturers. Moreover, current regulations put obstacles in the 
path of third parties who might try to make such improvements to other manufacturers’ 
drugs. Third-party researchers may lack access to data that would be needed to validate 
a targeting strategy for an approved drug and, even if they succeed in validating a new 
targeting strategy, cross-labeling of the drug and TAB test may not be possible (See 
Section V.D, infra).
Pharmacogenomics fundamentally challenges the notion that an FDA-approved 
drug is a fi nished product. An untargeted drug—a drug that has been approved by 
129 See, generally, B.J. Evans, & E.M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research Through Harmo-
nization of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with Banked Specimens, 
27 JOURNAL OF LEGAL MEDICINE 119 (2006).  
130 Lesko & Woodcock, supra note 3, at 767.
131 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing limits of FDA’a authority to require postmarket 
studies and other measures to improve the risk-benefi t characteristics of a drug after its approval).
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FDA but which exhibits signifi cant individual variation in patient response—is but a 
work in progress. Pharmacogenomic research may be able to take this untargeted drug 
and turn it into a targeted drug, by discovering screening strategies that let the drug 
be prescribed more selectively for subgroups of patients who are likely to experience 
its benefi ts but not its risks. The targeted version of the drug is, in effect, a successor 
product, distinguished by an entirely new risk-benefi t ratio. It is a jet, rather than a 
propeller biplane. The question is, “Who should have the right to be involved in making 
that improvement—only the original manufacturer or other parties; and if other parties 
may participate, when and on what terms?”
It is a matter of national importance to promote adequate investment in postmarket 
research to make successive improvements to existing drugs. This task will require mo-
bilization of both public and private investment. Much of this research is in the nature 
of basic science, rather than product-specifi c research (e.g., basic genetic research and 
research into drug-metabolic pathways).132 Research to improve the targeting of one 
drug may produce information relevant to other drugs, creating a free-rider problem 
as manufacturers wait for others to take the lead. This may impede private investment, 
and federal funding agencies such as the NIH may need to provide leadership, both in 
setting research priorities and in funding the research. Public funding for this research, 
at present, is quite limited.
FDA also has an important role to play, by pursuing policies that will improve the 
incentives for private investment in this research. There is a tendency, in the pharma-
ceutical industry and among policymakers, to think of postmarket research in product-
specifi c terms, e.g., FDA’s postmarket study requirements are aimed at answering specifi c 
questions about the safety or effectiveness of a particular product. Pharmacogenomics 
demands that policymakers adopt a wider vision of the role of research in the postap-
proval phase of product life. How can existing products be improved, and what needs to 
be done to attract adequate levels of public and private investment to make it happen? 
Legislative action may be needed to authorize appropriate cost-spreading mechanisms, 
so that the costs of postmarket research can be shared fairly among public and private 
sources, including all that stand to benefi t from better targeting (such as physicians, 
patients, and insurers, as well as drug manufacturers).133
To reap the true promise of personalized medicine, the United States needs to promote 
successive improvement of existing drugs, whether by the drug manufacturer or by other 
parties in the webbed network of pharmacogenomic discovery and development. A major 
challenge will be to balance the interests of all the parties concerned, including drug 
manufacturers, so that there are healthy incentives both for the initial development of 
new drugs, and for successive improvement of these products. Third-party improvements 
raise diffi cult issues about the rights of drug manufacturers to control the subsequent 
development of their products, versus the public’s interest in promoting better targeting 
of existing drugs. The legitimate proprietary interests of the original drug manufacturer 
must be protected, to ensure a healthy pipeline of new drugs.
On the other hand, reasonable limits must be placed on the power drug manufactur-
ers have to block successive improvements by third parties. Drug manufacturers have 
long taken the position that they should have the right to use other parties’ patented 
research tools and upstream discoveries in drug-development research, so that these 
132 Id. at 51.
133 Evans & Flockhart, supra note 7, at 54-57, 62.
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discoveries can be translated into new drugs that benefi t patients.134 Turnabout may 
be fair play. The same policy arguments that justify drug manufacturers’ use of other 
people’s upstream research tools in drug development—i.e., that it is in the public inter-
est to bring new therapies to patients—may apply with equal force, when a third party 
desires to improve the targeting of an existing drug. FDA-approved drugs are now just 
one more “upstream” discovery—one more upstream “tool,” as it were—on the road 
to developing fi nished, targeted therapies. Striking a fair balance may require new and 
novel concepts. One of these would be to introduce “improve-it-or-lose-it” provisions 
that grant drug manufacturers a set period of time, for example, three to fi ve years, 
to improve the targeting of their drugs following initial approval. During this period, 
manufacturers would be granted signifi cant power to block cross-labeling of their drug 
products with TAB tests developed by third parties. However, at the end of this period, 
third parties would enjoy increased rights to cross-label their TAB tests with existing 
drugs, if the drug manufacturer has failed to improve drug targeting.
Less controversial reforms may include simple steps to reduce the barriers to voluntary 
cooperation between drug manufacturers and third-party developers of targeting tests. 
Much remains unclear, and legal uncertainty has a chilling effect on multi-party develop-
ment and marketing of new targeted therapies. How will liabilities be apportioned; how 
will adverse events be reported; does the rate of treatment failure (lack of effectiveness) 
need to be systematically reported and disclosed to physicians or patients; how will 
advertising and promotion work for targeted therapies that involve a drug and a TAB test 
that were not developed in a cooperative setting? Under what circumstances will a TAB 
test that works with an innovator drug require separate validation for use in targeting 
generic versions of that same drug? When a drug undergoes signifi cant changes, such 
as a change in formulation, should notice be provided to makers of TAB tests and to 
clinicians, so that they can be advised to re-validate their targeting strategies? Each of 
these examples raises complex issues in itself, and they are but a few examples. Targeted 
therapies are a relatively new phenomenon, and many of the postmarket regulatory is-
sues they present have yet to be encountered. Postmarket regulation will be all the more 
complex in future years, as successive improvement activities become a more routine 
and expected phase of the drug development process.
VII. CONCLUSION 
Two central policy problems in pharmacogenomics are, fi rst, to establish a frame-
work for developing, assessing, and approving the tests that will be used for targeting 
of therapies and, second, to promote the appropriate use of these tests in day-to-day 
clinical decisionmaking. These matters are closely interrelated and successful clinical 
translation of pharmacogenomics requires attention to both. In addition to FDA, other 
parties—such as the medical profession, the scientifi c community, and state medical 
boards—also have important roles to play, and these roles need to be more thoroughly 
134 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae briefs submitted in support of the Petitioner in the case Merck KGAA v. 
Integra Lifesciences I, LTD, 545 U.S. 193 (2005): Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, 2005 WL 429972, at 23 (arguing that a narrow reading of the exemption from patent infringe-
ment in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) would harm public health by deterring research to establish the safety and 
effectiveness of new drugs); Brief of Amici Curiae Eli Lilly and Company, Wyeth, and Pfi zer Inc in Support 
of Petititoner, 2005 WL 435888, at 13, 17, (arguing that a broad reading of the § 271(e)(1) exemption that 
includes upstream “tool patents” is necessary to effect Congressional intent to promote timely development 
of new drugs); Brief of Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. and Biogen Idec, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, 2005 
WL 435893, at 3 (arguing that a broad reading of the § 271(e)(1) exemption from patent liability for testing 
and evaluation of new drugs is necessary to encourage innovation). 
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elaborated. Novel approaches, and perhaps entirely new regulatory bodies and institu-
tions, may be required.
A larger question we, as a society, need to be asking is, “What do we want pharma-
cogenomics and personalized medicine to be, once the underlying science matures?” 
Do we want personalized medicine to be the standard of care, so that physicians, phar-
maceutical companies, and clinical laboratories face suits for drug-related injuries that 
might have been genetically predicted and avoided? Should pharmacogenomics instead 
have an exculpatory signifi cance, so that the patient rather than the doctor or manufac-
turer bears responsibility for injuries that can be traced to “personal weaknesses” in the 
patient’s own genome? This already is being argued both ways. Will genetic screening 
be just another unenforceable provision of FDA-approved labeling in a world where 
physicians long have had discretion to disregard indications, warnings, and instructions 
and prescribe medical products off-label? Will pharmacogenomics make its way into 
state medical practice standards, with doctors facing disciplinary action for recklessly 
prescribing drugs without fi rst ordering the “right” genetic tests? More fundamentally, 
who is going to decide what the right tests are? How we answer these questions—and 
many others beside them—will defi ne what the clinical utility of pharmacogenetic 
testing turns out to be.
Science is more nimble than the legal constructs with which people hope to constrain 
it and channel it in benefi cial directions. Pharmacogenomics and targeted therapies—as 
a science, as an element of medical practice, and as a focus of industrial and commercial 
activity—present novel issues that ultimately may require major changes to existing laws 
and regulations, which were designed with an earlier generation of medical products in 
mind. This article has sought to stimulate discussion about what should be included on 
the checklist of regulatory issues that must be resolved, if personalized medicine is to 
become a common clinical reality. Once there is consensus on what the problems are, 
the debate over solutions will undoubtedly be contentious, but that does not mean the 
debate can be deferred. The science is dictating the timing.
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